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Abstract. Corporate influence in government is more than a national issue; it is an 
international phenomenon. For years, businesses have been infiltrating international legal 
processes. They secretly lobby lawmakers through front groups: “astroturf” imitations of 
grassroots organizations. But because this business lobbying is covert, it has been 
underappreciated in both the literature and the law. This Article unearths the “astroturf 
activism” phenomenon. It offers an original descriptive account that classifies modes of 
business access to international officials and identifies harms, then develops a critical 
analysis of the laws that regulate this access. I show that the perplexing set of access rules 
for aspiring international lobbyists creates the transparency problem I identify by 
prohibiting all but covert business access. I argue that the access rules have been rendered 
obsolete by globalization and fundamental changes in relationships between national 
governments and multinational business entities. To that historical critique, this Article 
adds an efficiency account and an evaluation of the law’s conceptual coherence that draws 
from pluralistic theory. The analysis gives rise to two potential avenues for reform. One 
proposal would require enhanced disclosures, and the other would offer formal access to 
business entities, engaging business input but also exposing it. Either potential reform 
would update the law to better accommodate contemporary business roles in international 
governance. The stakes, I show, are high. On the one hand, business can offer lawmakers 
expertise and politically neutral solutions. On the other hand, unchecked business 
influence can obstruct and neutralize laws aimed at solving critical global problems. 
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Introduction 
A newer kind of national business organization is the corporate front group 
which presents itself to the community as an NGO rather than a business 
organization. . . . These “astroturf” (as distinct from grass-roots) NGOs . . . are the 
most sincere form of flattery the business community pays to the efficacy of 
social movement politics.1 
Citizens United v. FEC famously held that the First Amendment confers on 
corporations the right to express themselves through unlimited spending on 
political speech.2 The holding allegedly unleashed a torrent of corporate 
political spending3 and certainly sparked a vigorous public debate about 
corporate rights to participate in the U.S. lawmaking process.4 The Citizens 
United debate has featured a sharp critique by President Obama, “a flurry” of 
proposed fixes in Congress, campaigns to amend the U.S. Constitution, and an 
avalanche of academic commentary and public protest.5  
But the attention stops at the border. The scholarly and popular uproar is 
focused on corporate participation in U.S. domestic political processes; it does 
 1. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 489 (2000) 
(offering as examples of astroturf NGOs “Consumers for World Trade (a pro-GATT 
industry coalition), Citizens for Sensible Control of Acid Rain (a coal and electricity 
industry front), and the National Wetlands Coalition (US oil company and real estate 
developers)”).  
 2. 558 U.S. 310, 340, 365 (2010) (holding 5-4 that the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from restricting independent political expenditures by corporate entities).  
 3. This corporate political spending is said to be channeled secretly, through “dark 
money” and Super PACs. See Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 
5 Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2015/01/21/5-years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics 
(arguing that Citizens United has resulted in a “deluge of cash poured into so-called super 
PACs—particularly single-candidate PACs, or political action committees—which are 
only nominally independent from the candidates they support” and that “much of this 
spending, known as ‘dark money,’ never has to be publicly disclosed”). 
 4. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 143 
(2010) (“Citizens United v. FEC unleashed a torrent of popular criticism . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)); see also, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political 
Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 83-85 (2010) (noting that “[c]onstitutional law 
scholars will long debate the wisdom” of Citizens United and offering a corporate law 
analysis of its implications); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of 
Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 583 (2011) (arguing that Citizens United “amplified 
other significant, incoherent aspects of the [Court’s] campaign finance jurisprudence”). 
 5. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 143; see also Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The 
Constitutional Right that Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 639, 639 (2011) (discussing how the opinion “captured the public imagina-
tion”). 
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not extend to legal systems beyond U.S. borders.6 The truth is that businesses 
also carry expressive rights in international legal processes.7 In particular, 
businesses are able to secretly gain access to international officials by 
exploiting an obscure set of rules developed by the Economic and Social 
Council (“the Council” or ECOSOC), an organ of the United Nations. Businesses 
do this by creating or commandeering nonprofit associations, which in turn 
register as “consultants” with special rights to advise international officials. 
Businesses thus work covertly through nonprofit groups to exploit the special 
access those organizations enjoy.8 I call this phenomenon “astroturf activism” 
in international law.9  
 6. The press captured news of backroom deals by business lobbyists during the secretive 
negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. See Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of 
Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264, 266 n.1 (2016) (“[T]he majority of Congress is being kept 
in the dark as to the substance of the [Trans-Pacific Partnership] negotiations, while 
representatives of U.S. corporations—like Halliburton, Chevron, PHRMA, Comcast, 
and the Motion Picture Association of America—are being consulted and made privy to 
details of the agreement.” (alterations in original) (quoting 158 CONG. REC. S3517 (daily 
ed. May 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Wyden))); Taylor Wofford, What Is the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and Why Are Critics Upset by It?, NEWSWEEK (June 12, 2015, 1:12 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/what-tpp-trade-deal-342449 (“[D]rafts of the agreement 
[are] under lock and key, although some 700 ‘cleared advisers,’ most of them corporate 
lobbyists, have been able to read it and make suggestions.”). But little is known and 
written about the mechanisms and effects of business influence on international treaty 
production. See Durkee, supra, at 266-67 (arguing that “the mechanisms, extent, and 
effects of business participation” in treatymaking are “understudied and underappreci-
ated”); Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. 
L. REV. 147, 150 (2009) (proposing this area of research); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing 
International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1595-601 (2011) (noting a lack of information 
about the degree and effect of corporate participation in international lawmaking). 
 7. See Part I below for an examination of the legal rules that give rise to these rights, 
specifically Article 71 of the United Nations Charter and subsequent accreditation rules 
developed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council pursuant to Article 71. 
 8. See Part I.C below for an examination of this legal structure. 
 9. This Article is not the first to use the term “astroturf” to refer to corporate use of the 
“grassroots” form. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 489 (using the term 
“astroturf NGOs” to refer to corporate front groups). Indeed, the term “astroturf 
activism” itself has appeared in the press in various contexts. See, e.g., “Astroturf 
Activism”: Leaked Memo Reveals Oil Industry Effort to Stage Rallies Against Climate 
Legislation, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.democracynow.org/
2009/8/21/astroturf_activism_leaked_memo_reveals_oil (alleging that the American 
Petroleum Institute asked oil companies to recruit their employees to participate in 
rallies against climate change legislation); George Joseph & StudentNation, Astroturf 
Activism: Who Is Behind Students for Education Reform?, NATION (Jan. 11, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/astroturf-activism-who-behind-students 
-education-reform (alleging that the organization “Students for Education Reform” is a 
front for a corporate lobbying firm). This Article adopts the “astroturf activism” term 
in a new context to refer to the phenomenon this Article uncovers whereby corpora-
tions use nonprofit NGOs as front groups to advance business interests through the 
U.N. consultancy system.   
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Astroturf activism, facilitated by dysfunctional legal rules, obscures 
business influence in international lawmaking, casts suspicion on legitimate 
public interest organizations (often called “nongovernmental organizations” or 
NGOs), and blunts the power of international actors to effectively regulate 
corporate access.10 It also sacrifices the expertise and efficiency benefits 
businesses might offer lawmakers in a well-regulated process.11  
This Article offers an original study to uncover and describe the astroturf 
activism phenomenon in the context of international organizations such as the 
the Council and a theory of the legal failures that produce the phenomenon. 
The argument is this: astroturf activism is the product of archaic access rules 
that fail to accommodate drastically altered relationships between two sets of 
actors. Those actors are, on the one hand, national governments and their 
international lawmakers and, on the other, the business sector, which has 
exploded in size and global influence since the early twentieth century when 
the access rules were developed. The flaws in the law, I argue, are rooted in 
obsolescence.  
This obsolescence yields perverse incentives toward covert behavior, 
forcing businesses to dissemble or lose out on access to officials and 
lawmakers.12 The resulting harm stretches in two directions: In one direction, 
the law provides an incentive for business to infiltrate the NGO world in a way 
that attenuates accountability, mixes messages, and threatens the legitimacy of 
NGO participation in international lawmaking.13 In the other direction, the 
law curbs the effectiveness of contributions businesses can make to 
lawmaking.14 It forces businesses to aggregate into associations that may be 
poor fits for their expertise and agendas, provide lowest-common-
denominator proposals, or capture the agendas of weaker public interest 
organizations.15 The law also taxes the resources of gatekeepers—who have 
insufficient mechanisms to judge between different would-be participants in 
the international process—and institutional decisionmakers—who face an 
onslaught of input from often-veiled sources.16 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. See generally Durkee, supra note 6, at 306-11 (showing that business participation in 
international law production can sometimes be beneficial, as businesses can contribute 
expertise, break geopolitical logjams, and offer efficient solutions).  
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part II.C.1-2. 
 14. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 15. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 16. See infra Part II.C.3. The project shares objectives with liberal theory in international 
legal scholarship, which seeks to understand how interest groups shape international 
law. The liberal account, however, focuses on the ways interest groups influence 
domestic lawmakers, who in turn enter into international agreements. See, e.g., Oona A. 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1952-54 
footnote continued on next page 
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This project is both descriptive and critical. Descriptively, this Article 
identifies the legal structure that creates the astroturf activism phenomenon 
and its effects. To do so, this Article uses a multisource approach to uncover 
forms of secret corporate access to lawmakers.17 It shows that the phenomenon 
I describe as astroturf activism occurs in at least three modes: (1) businesses 
capture existing NGOs or form their own NGOs with nonprofit status and 
mission statements that obscure the company’s true interests; (2) for-profit 
entities exploit gatekeeping weaknesses to gain access notwithstanding their 
noncompliance with eligibility rules; or (3) powerful businesses capture trade 
associations that purport to speak on behalf of a wider range of actors in a 
particular industry.18  
What is the source of this covert mayhem? The astroturf activism practice 
arises as businesses try to take advantage of “consultancy” status at internation-
al organizations like the Council or the World Health Organization (WHO). 
The consultancy status offers special access to international officials and 
lawmakers.19 Significantly, these consultative relationships are limited to 
nonprofit associations and exclude for-profit corporations and other business 
entities.20 Rather than sit on the sidelines, however, businesses surreptitiously 
(2002) (identifying the core aims of liberal theory); see also Andrew Moravcsik, Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 516-21 
(1997) (elaborating liberal theory in international relations and explaining that 
domestic constituencies construct state interests). Interest group pressures also play a 
role in process-based accounts of law’s development and reception. See, e.g., Eyal 
Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 168-70 (1999) 
(conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups); Rachel 
Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 
(2004) (arguing that domestic interest groups can advocate for international agree-
ments in an attempt to influence domestic law and policy); Harold Hongju Koh, Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2654-56 (1997) (reviewing Abram 
Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with Interna-
tional Regulatory Agreements (1995); and Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International 
Law and Institutions (1995)) (explaining that government officials, NGOs, “transna-
tional moral entrepreneurs,” and business entities all generate norms that are later 
formalized in international law). Those accounts, however, do not isolate the role of 
business actors in lawmaking and study the effect of those business roles on interna-
tional law. There is much more to be understood.  
 17. For a description of this Article’s research methods, see Part II.A below. 
 18. For an examination of these modes of access, see Part II.B below. 
 19. For a discussion of the rules governing this access, see Part I.B-C below. The legal roots 
of this consultancy structure lie in the United Nations Charter, which empowers the 
Council to make arrangements to consult with NGOs “concerned with matters within 
its competence.” U.N. Charter art. 71. 
 20. See infra Part I.C.1-2; see also Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status, NGO BRANCH: 
DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30 (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) 
(describing the groups anticipated by these criteria as “international, regional, sub-
regional, national non-governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, public 
sector or voluntary organizations”). 
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find access through creating or co-opting the traditional NGO format.21 In fact, 
a business literature even guides businesses in how to effectively gain access by 
making use of the NGO form.22  
Because much of this behavior is underground, little attention has been 
paid to its significance.23 Yet, at the same time, a robust literature considers the 
role of NGOs as a whole in international governance.24 While this literature 
sometimes cautions that NGO participation can lack accountability or 
legitimacy,25 it often celebrates NGOs as “democratizers” that exercise moral 
authority and enhance the legitimacy of the international process.26 Prominent 
 21. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 489 (explaining that these front or 
captured NGOs do not present themselves as business organizations); Fairouz El Tom, 
Diversity and Inclusion on NGO Boards: What the Stats Say, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2013,  
5:56 AM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals 
-network/2013/apr/29/diversity-inclusion-ngo-board (finding that over half of the 
“[t]op 100 NGOs” had one or more board members affiliated with companies that invest 
in or provide services to the arms, tobacco, and finance industries); see also infra Part 
II.B. 
 22. See Robert W. Fri, The Corporation as Nongovernment Organization, COLUM. J. WORLD 
BUS., Fall & Winter 1992, at 90, 92-93 (recommending that business entities consider 
participating in U.N. activities by sponsoring or partnering with NGOs); see also infra 
Part II.B.2. 
 23. See generally Stephan, supra note 6, at 1577 (proposing that more attention be paid to 
private sector influence on international lawmaking). By contrast, a robust literature 
considers the role of business in standard setting, “bottom-up” lawmaking, and 
regulatory cooperation. See, e.g., TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL 
RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 29-33 (2011) 
(identifying private nonmarket regulatory regimes); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up 
Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 
YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 126-27 (2005) (showing how business entities participate in setting 
standards that can become absorbed into formal law); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, 
Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547, 548-50 (2005) 
(describing the entrenchment of international regulatory standardization through 
bureaucratic cooperation). 
 24. See Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 161 n.2 (2002) (“Reflecting 
the rise of non-state actors, the academic and policy literature on NGOs has itself 
exploded.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, “Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance, Global 
Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841, 846, 890 (2011) (arguing that 
NGOs serve as their own gatekeepers and their “legitimacy” in the international system 
is an empty form of auto-legitimation); Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of 
International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 358 (2000) (noting that while 
“[p]articipation by non-State actors in the international system greatly enhances [the] 
accountability” of the international legal system, it can also be difficult for donors and 
“those affected by the NGOs to hold them accountable”). 
 26. For an overview of the literature, see Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations 
and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 365-66 (2006). See also Spiro, supra note 24, 
at 162 (“[T]he accountability challenge may be better answered by formally and fully 
recognizing NGO power in international institutional architectures.”); infra Part I.A. 
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international officials share this assessment: U.N. Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali called NGO activity a “basic form of popular representation in 
the present-day world” and “a guarantee of . . . political legitimacy.”27 Later, 
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan praised the rise of NGO consultants as a 
“revolution” and a “global people-power.”28 Finally, in a 2004 report on the 
consultancy program, U.N. officials continued to champion participation by 
civil society, asserting that “[t]he growing participation and influence of non-
State actors is enhancing democracy and reshaping multilateralism.”29 
As this Article shows, the “people” advancing this global “revolution” are 
often corporations. And many of these “democratizing” NGOs are associations 
of business entities. Do they too proceed from moral authority and enhance the 
legitimacy of the international legal process? I argue that, in fact, sometimes 
business input can enhance procedural legitimacy and improve substantive 
outcomes. But legal reforms are needed to capture these benefits and guard 
against the harms business influence can cause. I offer a set of principles to 
guide these reforms in order to better regulate business contributions and more 
appropriately suit twenty-first-century relationships between international 
officials, public interest NGOs, and business actors. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by identifying the 
Council’s consultancy law and exploring its perplexing application to business 
entities. Part II documents the astroturf activism phenomenon through an 
original study and a taxonomy, cataloging the results as problems of opacity, 
mission accountability, gatekeeping, and access. Part III constructs a critical 
analysis—rooted in a historical account but also drawing on functionalism and 
pluralistic theory—and develops a set of principles to guide legal reform. 
I. A Regime of Consultants 
The astroturf activism phenomenon in international law and governance 
is a product of the international legal rules that offer a special consultancy 
status to nonprofit entities but exclude businesses. This Part first frames the 
 27. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Sec’y-Gen., United Nations, Keynote Address to the 47th 
DPI/NGO Conference: We the Peoples: Building Peace (Sept. 20, 1994), in 47TH ANNUAL 
DPI/NGO CONFERENCE FINAL REPORT 3, 3 (1994).  
 28. Press Release, Sec’y-Gen., Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing 
Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks, U.N. 
Press Release SG/SM/7318 (Feb. 29, 2000). 
 29. Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, We the Peoples: 
Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance, in letter dated June 7, 2004 
from the Chair of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society 
Relations addressed to the Secretary-General, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 11, 2004) 
[hereinafter Cardoso Report]. 
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discussion by offering a vivid case study in astroturfing, then identifies the 
relevant legal rules and describes their operation.  
A. Who Makes International Law? 
During the course of the infamous mass tort litigation in the United States 
against Philip Morris and other tobacco companies, litigators accomplished a 
major strategic coup d’état through the simple act of discovery.30 The tobacco 
companies were forced to produce thousands of documents that drew the 
curtain on a vast and insidious array of strategies the companies used to resist 
tobacco control.31  
Among the buried secrets was evidence that the industry had not confined 
itself to efforts to influence domestic regulation—rather, it had also launched an 
“elaborate, well financed, sophisticated, and usually invisible” campaign of 
deliberate subversion of international lawmaking institutions.32 The campaign 
was focused most intensely on the WHO,33 as the tobacco companies sought to 
shape that organization’s agenda. The revelation of these tactics came at a time 
when the WHO was in the midst of developing a major international treaty 
targeted at regulating the tobacco industry: the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (Tobacco Convention).34 As a committee of experts who 
reviewed the tobacco industry documents concluded, “[t]hat tobacco companies 
resist proposals for tobacco control comes as no surprise, but what is now 
visible is the scale, intensity and, importantly, the tactics, of their campaigns.”35 
The scale and intensity of the tobacco companies’ campaign, however, was 
shrouded in secrecy. Most of their efforts to influence international lawmakers 
were covert. Their tactics included hiring former WHO officials to gain 
valuable contacts within the organization,36 secretly “pitting other U.N. 
agencies against WHO,”37 manipulating the scientific and public health debate 
 30. COMM. OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUS. DOCUMENTS, WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO 
COMPANY STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL ACTIVITIES AT THE WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION 25 (2000), http://www.who.int/tobacco/resources/
publications/general/who_inquiry/en [hereinafter TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES 
REPORT]. 
 31. See id. at 25, 30. 
 32. Id. at iii. 
 33. Id. (“The tobacco companies’ own documents show that they viewed WHO, an 
international public health agency, as one of their foremost enemies . . . [and] instigated 
global strategies to discredit and impede WHO’s ability to carry out its mission.”). 
 34. Id. at 80 (warning that the tobacco industry would likely mobilize to oppose the 
Tobacco Convention). 
 35. Id. at 228. 
 36. Id. at 2, 37. 
 37. Id. at 1. 
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about the health effects of tobacco through funding purportedly “independent” 
experts,38 speaking through developing countries by convincing them that the 
WHO’s tobacco control program was a “First World” agenda unworthy of 
their attention and support,39 and conducting secret surveillance of WHO 
activities.40  
This battery of covert activities reveals the technique this Article calls 
“astroturf activism”: the tobacco companies “hid behind a variety of ostensibly 
independent quasi-academic, public policy, and business organizations whose 
tobacco industry funding was not disclosed.”41 In particular, these included 
tobacco company-created front groups and trade unions that had obtained 
consultative status at the WHO.42 These groups used their consultant status to 
lobby against tobacco control activities generally and more specifically against 
the treaty aimed at responding to the globalization of the “tobacco epidemic”43: 
the Tobacco Convention.44 It is impossible to fully measure the results of the 
tobacco companies’ campaign against the WHO and Tobacco Convention45—
and the Tobacco Convention was ultimately successful against these odds.46 
But the tobacco industry activities did succeed in “slow[ing] and undermin[ing]” 
the WHO’s tobacco control campaign and therefore effective tobacco 
regulation around the world.47  
 38. Id. at 3, 50. 
 39. Id. at 1, 23, 30, 86. 
 40. Id. at 53. 
 41. Id. at iii. 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“[T]obacco companies made prominent use of the International Tobacco 
Growers’ Association (ITGA) . . . [which] claims to represent the interests of local 
farmers. The documents indicate, however, that tobacco companies have funded the 
organization and directed its work.”); see also infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 43. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Foreword, opened for signature 
May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S 166, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42811/1/
9241591013.pdf?ua=1 [hereinafter Tobacco Convention].  
 44. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 6, 80. Incidentally, the 
Tobacco Convention was the first treaty negotiated under WHO auspices. Tobacco 
Convention, supra note 43, at Foreword.  
 45. The report of the Committee of Experts was released during the preparation and prior 
to the conclusion of the Tobacco Convention. However, the experts concluded that the 
tobacco industry would likely continue its “sophisticated and sustained” campaign to 
“attempt to defeat” the Tobacco Convention or “to transform the proposal into a 
vehicle for weakening national tobacco control initiatives.” TOBACCO COMPANY 
STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 18-19.  
 46. See About the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/fctc/about/en (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) (noting that the WHO 
Tobacco Convention entered into force on February 27, 2005 and “has since become 
one of the most rapidly and widely embraced treaties in United Nations history”). 
 47. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at iii. As one example, the 
documents disclose that Phillip Morris took credit for a decision by the WHO to “drop 
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Business entities influence international lawmaking. The tobacco industry 
example demonstrates the proposition in an unfortunately nefarious manner. 
Not all examples of business influence put business at odds with international 
regulators.48 But the nature and extent of business influence remains 
underappreciated and underexamined.49  
By contrast, a voluminous literature considers business influence on 
informal or “bottom-up” lawmaking—that is, business roles in setting codes of 
conduct and private standards, contributing to “soft” or voluntary internation-
al law or international regulation, and engaging in investor-state arbitration 
that imports content into investment treaty regimes.50 That literature 
tar and nicotine reductions” from a policy agenda. Id. at 64; see also id. at iii (arguing that 
“[a]lthough the number of lives damaged or lost as a result of the tobacco companies’ 
subversion of WHO may never be quantified,” on “the basis of the volume of attempted 
and successful acts of subversion identified . . . it is reasonable to believe that the 
tobacco companies’ subversion of WHO’s tobacco control activities has resulted in 
significant harm”).  
 48. See Durkee, supra note 6, at 295-97 (examining diverse and important business 
contributions to a successful private law treaty, the Cape Town Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment). 
 49. See id. at 266-67, 288-91; see also Stephan, supra note 6, at 1577 (urging attention to the 
role of private actors in international lawmaking). While the international legal 
literature has far to go in this area, Braithwaite and Drahos have made a substantial 
contribution in sociology. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 27-33 
(detailing a major study’s findings: that large corporations are effective actors in 
“enrolling the power of states and the power of the most potent international 
organizations” to shape global regulations). For a discussion of the literature on 
business influence in the environmental context, see note 64 below. 
 50. See, e.g., BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 23, at 29-33 (describing private standardization 
regimes); VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-5 (2001) (exploring the phenomenon of industry 
self-regulation in codes of conduct and coordinated standards); Kenneth W. Abbott & 
Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New 
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 513 
(2009) (describing transnational regulation as the product of a “[g]overnance [t]riangle” 
between states, firms, and NGOs (bolding omitted)); Julian Arato, Corporations as 
Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 232-33 (2015) (showing that business entities engage 
in arbitration that defines the terms of bilateral investment treaties); Dan Danielsen, 
How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation 
and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 412 (2005) (identifying private businesses’ 
various roles in global governance); Levit, supra note 23, at 126 (identifying “[b]ottom-
up lawmaking” as the idea that “practitioners—both public and private— . . . create, 
interpret, and enforce their rules” and arguing that “[o]ver time, these initially informal 
rules blossom into law that is just as real and just as effective, if not more effective,  
as . . . treaties”); Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, The New Political Role of 
Business in a Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and Its Implications 
for the Firm, Governance, and Democracy, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 899, 911 (2011) (“Business 
firms engage in processes of self-regulation through ‘soft law’ in instances where state 
agencies are unable or unwilling to regulate.”); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in 
International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 56-58 
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principally identifies, in Gregory Shaffer’s terms, the ways that businesses 
construct “private legal systems . . . and private institutions to enforce” them51 
and examines the way that those private systems sometimes make their way 
into formal law.52  
Less has been said in the legal literature about direct business influence on 
international lawmakers and, in turn, on formal international treaty law.53 In a 
previous article, I offered case studies to show that businesses can be deeply 
involved at all points in the treaty production process and that this has 
significant implications for the health of international treaty regimes.54 The 
article also observed that, at least in the private law context, business input can 
at times improve the treaty production process by offering expertise, 
proposing politically neutral solutions acceptable to differently situated states, 
moving the process expeditiously forward, assisting with implementation, and 
monitoring compliance.55 That work began to respond to the call for more 
sustained analysis of business influence on formal international lawmaking. 
But it also revealed important gaps in the legal literature in this area. In sum, 
while corporate pressure on lawmakers has long been a topic of interest within 
U.S. domestic legal literature, there is a striking lacuna in this area in 
international legal literature.56  
(2014) (describing the mechanism whereby the WTO Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures incorporates international standards). 
 51. Shaffer, supra note 6, at 151-52 (organizing business impact on lawmaking into two 
broad categories: creating private law and influencing public lawmakers).  
 52. See sources cited supra note 50. 
 53. See Danielsen, supra note 50, at 411 (noting that “scholars have focused little attention 
on . . . the precise mechanisms through which corporations contribute to transnational 
regulation and governance” or the welfare effects of those corporate contributions); 
Shaffer, supra note 6, at 175-76 (collecting literature); Stephan, supra note 6, at 1577 
(proposing this as a fertile area of research). 
 54. See Durkee, supra note 6, at 291-305 (offering case studies on the Cape Town 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, which is 
also known as the Rotterdam Rules). 
 55. See id. at 294-97. 
 56. This is not to say that the literature on interest group impacts on lawmakers is wholly 
absent. To the contrary, understanding the effect of domestic politics on the develop-
ment of international law is one of the central projects of liberal theory in internation-
al scholarship. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory 
of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470-83 (2005) (identifying core aims of legal 
theory and examining how international legal theory borrows from international 
relations); see also Moravcsik, supra note 16, at 518-20 (arguing that domestic constitu-
encies construct state interests). Moreover, the attention by liberal theorists to interest 
group influence on international law has inspired a broader literature. See, e.g., 
Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 168-70 (casting the sovereign state as an agent of small 
interest groups); Brewster, supra note 16, at 502 (arguing that domestic interest groups 
try to influence international law in order to set domestic policy); Koh, supra note 16, 
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The gap is demonstrated by a notable contrast: a “copious” literature 
examines the contributions and influences of NGOs on international 
lawmaking.57 Dozens of law review articles consider the NGO role in 
consulting with and influencing international lawmakers, through formal 
consultancy regimes and otherwise.58 The literature addresses, among other 
questions, the legal status of NGOs,59 the impact of NGOs on the lawmaking 
process,60 the legitimacy of NGO participation as consultants to international 
lawmakers,61 and whether NGOs might have a right to consult with 
international lawmakers.62 But this literature focuses its attention on classic 
public interest NGOs and not on business-promoting NGOs, such as industry 
or trade associations, or on business influence on public interest NGOs.63 In 
at 2656 (identifying a process-based theory that views substate officials and interest 
groups as involved in a process of law development, reception, and integration). But 
liberal theory and its progeny do little to explain how this interest group activity 
affects the ultimate success or failure of international treaties, nor do they isolate the 
role of business actors in lawmaking or study the effect of those business roles on 
international law. See Hathaway, supra note 16, at 1954-55 (noting some limitations of 
liberal theory). 
 57. Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 349-50. 
 58. See Spiro, supra note 24, at 161 n.2 (“[T]he academic and policy literature on NGOs  
has . . . exploded.”). For a relatively pithy overview of the NGO literature, see Char-
novitz, supra note 26, at 365-66, which identifies literatures related to the identity, 
functions, and legal status of NGOs, as well as the legitimacy and effects of NGO 
activity on the international stage. For an early annotated bibliography, see Yahya A. 
Dehqanzada, Annotated Bibliography, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CIVIL SOCIETY 241, 241-76 (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000). Despite the wealth of literature, 
Spiro points out that the role of NGOs in international lawmaking “remains under-
theorized.” Peter J. Spiro, NGOs and Human Rights: Channels of Power, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 115, 115 (Sarah Joseph & Adam 
McBeth eds., 2010). 
 59. See, e.g., Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-
Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579, 
580 (1999) (“This Article analyzes the legal consequences of the changing international 
system for the legal status of NGOs under international law.”). 
 60. See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 611 (2005) 
(“[N]o one questions today the fact that international law—both its content and its 
impact—has been forever changed by the empowerment of NGOs.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 846, 890 (arguing that NGOs serve as their own 
gatekeepers and their “legitimacy” in the international system is an empty form of 
auto-legitimation); Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs?: Human Rights 
Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
261, 264-65 (2004) (arguing that NGO access is insufficiently regulated). 
 62. See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation, 36 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 891, 909 (2011) (suggesting that “state practice is moving toward a 
duty to consult NGOs in the activities of” international organizations).  
 63. Many commentators “reserve the term ‘NGO’ for organizations that pursue a ‘public 
interest,’” rather than a profit motive. Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 350 n.12. Some do 
note that the term NGO can include organizations promoting profit-seeking business-
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doing so, this literature has not attended to the astroturf activism phenomenon 
this Article identifies. It does not focus on the ways that business influence is 
channeled through the consultancy system both overtly and covertly, nor does 
it analyze the implications of this phenomenon on the success or failure of 
international treaties.64  
es. See, e.g., id. at 350 (defining NGOs as “not profit seeking” but noting that “associations 
of business entities can be” NGOs (emphasis added)). But even those who include 
associations of businesses within their definition of NGO appear to have in mind 
public interest NGOs rather than, for example, industry associations. Steve Charnovitz 
himself argues that “[i]ndividuals join . . . an NGO out of commitment to its purpose” 
and thus give NGOs their “moral authority.” Id. at 348. Notably, while a subcurrent in 
the literature expresses concern that NGOs are insufficiently regulated, many celebrate 
NGO activity as enhancing the moral authority, representativeness, and democratic 
accountability of the international system. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying 
text.  
 64. There is a separate literature that highlights and critically examines the role of 
business-oriented NGOs in the context of environmental treaties. See, e.g., Chiara 
Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions in the Negotiations on Climate Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 220 (1999) (noting 
that business NGOs were active lobbyists at a number of different climate change 
treaty negotiations). This literature responds in part to the fact that some environmen-
tal treaties have different consultancy regimes than the one under consideration in this 
Article. See infra Part I.B.1 (examining the consultancy regime developed by the 
Council pursuant to Article 71 of the U.N. Charter and other regimes that follow the 
same format). For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) has developed a set of accreditation rules that “differentiates 
between research and independent NGOs (‘RINGOs’), business and industry NGOs 
(‘BINGOs’), environmental NGOs (‘ENGOs’), local NGOs, indigenous peoples organiza-
tions (‘IPOs’), local government and municipal authorities (‘LGMAs’), islanders, trade 
unions, and faith-based groups.” Stephen Tully, Commercial Contributions to the Climate 
Change Regime: Who’s Regulating Whom?, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2005, at 
14, 16. Thus, in the environmental treaty literature, “BINGO” is a familiar term. See, e.g., 
Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International Environmental Lawmaking: A Discourse 
Approach, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 378 (2008) (using the term “BINGO” to refer to “business 
and industry nongovernmental organizations”); Giorgetti, supra, at 220 (using the term 
“BNGO” to mean “interest groups that unite several companies to campaign for a 
specific point of view”); Monica Brookman, Book Note, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 369, 
374-75 (2000) (reviewing ANITA MARGRETHE HALVORSSEN, EQUALITY AMONG 
UNEQUALS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1999)) (referring to “business 
NGOs” as “large, influential lobbying groups” sometimes “represent[ing] commercial 
interests that are not always compatible with environmental protection”). While this 
environmental treaty literature recognizes the descriptive fact that businesses act 
through NGOs to influence international lawmakers (and sometimes offers a 
normative response), it does not focus on the critique developed in this Article: that 
forcing businesses to act through NGOs rather than independently creates perverse 
results. See, e.g., Joëlle de Sépibus & Kateryna Holzer, The UNFCCC at a Crossroads: Can 
Increased Involvement of Business and Industry Help Rescue the Multilateral Climate Regime?, 
8 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 23, 24 (2014) (urging increased business participation 
within the current UNFCCC consultancy structure). In fact, the critique and reforms 
developed in this Article may have equal force in the UNFCCC context, but that 
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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As the Tobacco Convention saga suggests, international treaties are under 
pressure.65 The popular press and academic literature alike observe that 
international treaty production faces an array of challenges, including global 
power imbalances, geopolitical logjams, and domestic legal and political 
pressures that can obstruct the production of a treaty altogether or eviscerate 
the effect of any treaty that is ultimately concluded.66 However, although 
treaties are under pressure, they remain indispensable legal tools.67 They erect 
the fundamental architecture of international governance—creating 
institutions and courts, setting the ground rules for informal cooperation and 
governance, and serving as the foundation upon which modern global 
regulatory life depends.68 And treaties remain fundamentally important to 
solving important global problems like climate change.69 Thus, in order to 
achieve better solutions to pressing global problems, legal doctrine and 
scholarship must address defects in treaty law.  
One important defect in treaty law is the lack of a specific regulatory 
response to business influence.70 And developing that regulatory response 
 65. Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of 
the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 497 & nn.13-14, 498 & nn.15-17 (2012) (identifying why 
treaties are ineffective at coordinating global financial regulations and collecting 
literature on multilateral treaty failures).  
 66. The domestic problem was on startling display in the United States recently as the 
Supreme Court granted a preliminary injunction halting the Obama Administration’s 
regulation of coal power plants to comply with the Paris Agreement—a major 
international agreement to combat climate change hailed as a great success just months 
earlier. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.) (granting a preliminary 
injunction halting the Environmental Protection Agency’s enforcement of President 
Obama’s Clean Power Plan while litigation over the plan is pending in the D.C. 
Circuit). The Supreme Court’s decision (albeit preliminary) put not just United States 
compliance into question but also that of India and China—the world’s two largest 
polluters—who may retract their commitments if the United States fails to uphold its 
own. Coral Davenport, Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris 
Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1V473CK (“If the U.S. 
Supreme Court actually declares the coal power plant rules stillborn, the chances of 
nurturing trust between countries would all but vanish . . . . This could be the 
proverbial string which causes Paris to unravel.” (quoting Navroz K. Dubash, Senior 
Fellow, Ctr. for Policy Research)). Thus, in one stroke of the Supreme Court’s pen, a 
major and important international agreement faces implosion. For critiques in the 
academic literature, see, for example, Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50, at 510, which 
criticizes the “persistent regulatory inadequacies” of treaty-based governance. 
 67. See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 74 nn.44-48, 75 nn.49-52, 76 
nn.53-57, 77 nn.58-61 (2013) (collecting literature). 
 68. Id.; see also Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
581, 614 (2005) (“[E]ven a networked world will require explicit agreements.”).  
 69. Durkee, supra note 67, at 74-75 (citing Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International 
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 282-83 (1992)). 
 70. See Durkee, supra note 6, at 268 (arguing that international law has not developed 
adequate tools to regulate business influence on lawmaking); see also BRAITHWAITE & 
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requires understanding the phenomenon to be regulated. This Article 
undertakes a foundational element of that task by narrowing in on a specific 
and important locus of business influence: the legal structure that gives rise to 
astroturf activism. For the purpose of this analysis, “astroturf activism” is the 
overt and covert use by business of the consultancy system at international 
institutions such as the Council and the WHO to influence international 
lawmaking, as subsequent Parts explain. 
An exposure and systematic analysis of the astroturf activism phenome-
non is long overdue. Over a decade ago, the committee of experts that 
considered the tobacco industry disclosures detailed above recommended that 
lawyers and policymakers rethink the relationships between the tobacco 
industry, NGOs, and lawmakers and find new means to expose the covert 
relationships between them.71 That work has yet to be done. Indeed, those 
experts recommended finding a way to disclose the identities and affiliations of 
all nonstate actors that attempt to influence the production of international 
law.72 That mission, vitally important to the health of modern multilateral 
treaty regimes, begins in the pages that follow.  
B.  The Consultancy Structure 
The first step in the mission the committee of experts identified is to 
clearly identify the legal structure that gives rise to the astroturf activism 
phenomenon. In other words, what is this consultancy structure that permits 
special access to international lawmakers?  
1. NGOs press for access to the United Nations 
The story begins at the drafting of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco at the 
conclusion of World War II. Twelve hundred NGOs were present in San 
Francisco at the time, some serving as part of the U.S. delegation to the 
Conference on International Organization, which would bring the United 
Nations to life.73 One of the agendas the NGOs were pursuing was obtaining 
some sort of status for themselves within the new organization.74 NGOs had 
DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 10-14 (using tools from sociology, macroeconomics, and 
psychology to examine unregulated business influence on domestic and international 
lawmakers).  
 71. In fact, the Tobacco Report was published in 2000. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES 
REPORT, supra note 30. 
 72. Id. at 9, 19, 104. 
 73. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 250-51 (1997). 
 74. See id. at 251 (reporting that NGO consultants sought “a provision on NGOs in the U.N. 
Charter,” an idea that had not been previously considered by state delegates).  
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been active in the earlier League of Nations and sought to preserve their access 
in the new United Nations.75 They were ultimately successful in these aims, as 
the U.N. Charter included Article 7176: “The Economic and Social Council may 
make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental 
organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such 
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where 
appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member 
of the United Nations concerned.”77 
Since Article 71 includes the only mention of associations in the U.N. 
Charter, the provision “has served de facto as a charter for NGO activities.”78 
This de facto charter both facilitates and restrains the opportunities for 
associations to take roles within the United Nations. It means that the only 
officially recognized way that an NGO can participate in the work of the 
United Nations is through the consultation arrangements the Council is 
empowered to make.79 The U.N. Charter does not, for example, contain any 
provision allowing nonstate associations to have voting privileges, 
membership on delegations to treaty-drafting conventions, or any other kind 
of rights. Notably, for the purposes of this analysis, the Charter also does not 
make any particular mention of access rights for business entities.80 
Article 71 is situated among the provisions of the U.N. Charter that 
constitute the Council, which is the organ of the United Nations charged with 
overseeing U.N. programs on “economic, social, cultural, educational, health, 
and related matters.”81 The Council also sets up commissions concerning the 
 75. Id.; see also id. at 258 (explaining that Article 71 served to “codify the custom of NGO 
participation” that had existed in the League of Nations period prior to World War II). 
 76. See id. at 250-51, 257 (describing how NGOs assisted in drafting Article 71). 
 77. U.N. Charter art. 71. 
 78. Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 357. 
 79. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 250 (“Not everyone viewed Article 71 as a step forward 
for NGOs. . . . [Some] viewed Article 71 as ‘a so-far-and-no-further obstacle to any 
continuance of the pragmatic but close . . . partnership [between NGOs and interna-
tional organizations] developed under the League.’” (quoting BERTRAM PICKARD, THE 
GREATER UNITED NATIONS: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE PLACE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 72 (1956))).  
 80. The text of the charter could be read to include individual business “organizations,” as 
businesses are, after all, the result of individuals organizing to accomplish a common 
purpose, with the only distinguishing feature being profit motive. Franklin G. Snyder 
has made a similar point, albeit outside of the U.N. Charter context. See Franklin G. 
Snyder, Sharing Sovereignty: Non-State Associations and the Limits of State Power, 54 AM. U. 
L. REV. 365, 378 (2004) (noting that business enterprises are “voluntary associations” just 
as NGOs are). However, this interpretation is likely not what the drafters intended. As 
Steve Charnovitz has noted, “[t]he practice of excluding commercial organizations 
from the category of ‘associations’ goes back at least to . . . 1910.” Charnovitz, supra note 
73, at 187 n.17. 
 81. U.N. Charter art. 62, ¶ 1. 
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economic, social, and other issues within its mandate.82 And, under the 
authority of Article 71, the Council has become the body charged with 
supervising and managing NGO access to the U.N. system.83 
2. The Council sets access regulations 
The Council has exercised its Article 71 authority and made “arrangements 
for consultation with non-governmental organizations” by developing rules to 
govern an accreditation procedure.84 Those rules define an NGO as “[a]ny 
international organization which is not established by intergovernmental 
agreement.”85 The definition reflects the Council’s principal concern at the 
time, which was to draw a distinction between international intergovernmental 
organizations (such as the United Nations itself) on the one hand and 
nongovernmental associations (such as Greenpeace) on the other.86 The Council 
was not trying to distinguish between different kinds of nongovernmental 
associations.87  
In the Council’s conception, consultative status serves dual purposes: to 
assist the United Nations in gathering relevant expertise from nongovernmen-
tal sources and to give members of civil society the opportunity to have access 
to governance functions and express their opinions.88 To that end, in 1996 the 
 82. Id. art. 68. 
 83. Ferdinand Trauttmansdorff, The Organs of the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS: 
LAW AND PRACTICE 25, 41 (Franz Cede & Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann eds., 2001). 
 84. U.N. Charter art. 71. The Council has passed various resolutions to govern NGO access 
to the United Nations pursuant to Article 71, including Resolution 4(I), Economic and 
Social Council Res. 4(I) (Feb. 14, 1946); Resolution 288(X)(B), which codified privileges 
and practices relating to NGOs that had developed between 1946 and 1950, Economic 
and Social Council Res. 288(X)(B) (Feb. 27, 1950); Resolution 1296 (XLIV), Economic 
and Social Council Res. 1296 (XLIV) (May 23, 1968); and, finally, Resolution 1996/31, 
which offered an updated set of rules that remain in effect as of this writing, Economic 
and Social Council Res. 1996/31 (July 25, 1996). For narrative descriptions of the 
functions of these resolutions, see Stephan Hobe, Article 71, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1788, 1797 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); and 
Rainer Lagoni, Article 71, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 
902, 904-05 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1995). 
 85. E.S.C. Res. 1296 (XLIV), supra note 84, ¶ 7. 
 86. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 252-53.  
 87. The definition did exclude national organizations on the theory that those national 
organizations could present their views to their own national governments. Id. at 253. 
The original rules provided for two tiers of access for NGOs (Category A and Category 
B) depending on the breadth of the NGO mission. See id. Of particular relevance to this 
Article’s analysis, “[a]mong the earliest Category A organizations admitted were the 
World Federation of Trade Unions” and the International Chamber of Commerce. Id. 
 88. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 20 (“[C]onsultative arrangements are to be made, 
on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling the Council or one of its bodies to secure 
expert information or advice from organizations . . . and, on the other hand, to enable 
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Council updated its eligibility criteria for associations with rules that remain in 
force today.89 The new criteria were intended to respond to a rise in the 
prominence of NGOs in the early 1990s and a perception that the earlier 
eligibility rules were too restrictive.90 In addition, with an increased global 
understanding of governance disparities between the developed and 
developing worlds, the new rules were meant to ensure “a just, balanced, 
effective and genuine involvement of non-governmental organizations from 
all regions and areas of the world.”91 In particular, the Council sought (1) an 
increased representation of associations from developing countries and (2) to 
ensure that accredited associations would be accountable representatives of the 
interests of their constituencies.92 The eligibility criteria were meant to assist 
the Council in achieving these objectives.  
The criteria required, first, that an association seeking consultative status 
have “aims and purposes” that support “the spirit, purposes and principles” of 
the United Nations and promote that body’s work.93 In addition, an association 
must be “of recognized standing within the particular field of its competence or 
of a representative character.”94 It must be able to establish the accountability 
and representativeness of its internal governance mechanisms through indicia 
such as “an established headquarters,”95 “a democratically adopted constitution” 
providing for a representative process to set policy,96 a responsive “executive 
organ,”97 and documented “authority to speak for its members through its 
international, regional, subregional and national organizations that represent 
important elements of public opinion to express their views.”). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. ¶ 5; see also Hobe, supra note 84, at 1800 (observing that the prior rules were 
perceived as too restrictive in their “narrow criteria for inclusion, the requirement of 
internationality, and the veto granted to States toward granting consultative status to 
NGOs from their own countries”). 
 91. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 5; see also Lagoni, supra note 84, at 912 (noting that 
“issues . . . unresolved” in 1995 included “the unequal representation under Art. 71 of 
non-governmental organizations from different regions of the world” and, in 
particular, the overrepresentation of organizations from Western industrialized 
countries). Resolution 1996/31 was passed to implement these reforms after a three-
year period of review. Hobe, supra note 84, at 1801. 
 92. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶¶ 1-17. The Council also eliminated the earlier 
distinction between international and national organizations but required that 
national organizations consult with the member state concerned prior to obtaining 
accreditation. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. 
 93. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. 
 94. Id. ¶ 9. 
 95. Id. ¶ 10. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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authorized representatives.”98 Finally, organizations must be nonprofits and 
obtain most of their funding from “national affiliate[] [organizations] . . . or 
from individual members.”99 
In addition to establishing admission criteria for would-be U.N. consult-
ants, the Council updated its gatekeeping mechanism. Specifically, it updated 
the rules governing the work of the Committee on Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO Committee),100 whose members it elects.101 The NGO 
Committee has jurisdiction over the accreditation application process.102 It 
receives applications from prospective NGO consultants and meets twice a 
year to vote on whether to grant accreditation to pending applicants.103 
Neither the Council nor the NGO Committee, however, independently verifies 
whether the organizations comply with the accreditation criteria.104 Rather, 
they rely on representations made by the organizations themselves in their 
application materials.105  
Organizations that successfully gain admission to the consultancy regime 
are organized into three tiers, which relate to the scope of the NGO’s activities 
and the degree of assistance it might offer the United Nations as a consult-
ant.106 “General” status is reserved for organizations that are the most global in 
footprint and pursue the broadest missions: they “are concerned with most of 
[the Council’s] activities,” can “demonstrate . . . sustained contributions . . . to the 
 98. Id. ¶ 11. Resolution 1996/31 also includes a repetitive catchall provision: the 
organization must possess “a representative structure and . . . appropriate mechanisms 
of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies 
and actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and 
transparent decision-making processes.” Id. ¶ 12. 
 99. Id. ¶ 13. There is a loophole: when an organization is financed from other sources, it 
must explain to the satisfaction of the Council (via its NGO Committee) the organiza-
tion’s reasons for not meeting these requirements. Id.  
 100. Id. ¶ 60; see also Jeffrey Andrew Hartwick, Non-Governmental Organizations at United 
Nations-Sponsored World Conferences: A Framework for Participation Reform, 26 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 223 (2003) (describing the functions of the NGO Committee). 
 101. Members of the committee are delegates from U.N. member states, selected “on the 
basis of equitable geographical representation.” E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 60. 
 102. Hartwick, supra note 100, at 223. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 224 & n.45 (stating that applications are first screened by the Council’s 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs and then sent to the NGO Committee, 
where “[v]oting rights and democratic accountability are determined by an examina-
tion of an NGO’s submitted constitution or by-laws” and financial status is determined 
by financial statements the organizations submit but noting that “[t]he UN does not 
actually verify” the information contained in these documents). 
 105. See id. 
 106. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶¶ 21-26; see also STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 66 (2007) (reviewing the tiered consultation structure); 
Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 267 (reviewing the tiers). 
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achievement of [U.N.] objectives,” and are “broadly representative of major 
segments of society in a large number of countries.”107 Greenpeace and 
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), for example, have 
obtained General consultative status.108 “Special” status is for organizations 
that are concerned with “a few of the fields of activity” the Council pursues, 
such as Human Rights Watch and the American Bar Association.109 Finally, 
“Roster” status falls short of full consultancy status and is granted to NGOs that 
do not qualify for the other two categories but may make “occasional and 
useful contributions” to the United Nations’ work.110 Among these are the 
Sierra Club and Heifer Project International.111 As of this Article’s writing, 
over 4600 organizations have taken advantage of consultancy status.112 
3. Consultants have access to lawmakers 
Let us turn to the access opportunities consultants gain through the 
consultancy. There are three principal points of access: to the Council itself and 
its commissions’ subsidiary bodies, to the broader United Nations, and—
perhaps most importantly for the purposes of influencing formal international 
lawmaking—to international conferences convened by the United Nations. 
First, access opportunities within the Council are keyed to the consultant’s 
tier, with the most rights afforded to General consultants.113 Consultants may 
 107. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 22; see also Kal Raustiala, NGOs in International 
Treaty-Making, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 150, 156 n.24 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 
2012) (noting that NGOs with general status “tend to be fairly large, established 
international NGOs with a broad geographical reach”). 
 108. Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, NGO BRANCH: DEP’T ECON. & 
SOC. AFF., http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?
method=search&sessionCheck=false (to locate, search “Greenpeace” in “Organization’s 
Name” search bar) (last visited Jan. 1, 2017); id. (to locate, search “Medecins Sans 
Frontieres” in “Organization’s Name” search bar). 
 109. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 23; Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other 
Accreditations, supra note 108 (to locate, search “Human Rights Watch” in “Organiza-
tion’s Name” search bar); id. (to locate, search “American Bar Association” in “Organiza-
tion’s Name” search bar); see also Raustiala, supra note 107, at 157 n.24 (stating that 
NGOs with Special consultative status “tend to be smaller and more recently estab-
lished”). 
 110. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 24; see also Raustiala, supra note 107, at 157 n.24 
(“Organizations that apply for consultative status but do not fit in any of the other 
categories are usually included in the Roster. These NGOs tend to have a rather narrow 
and/or technical focus.”).  
 111. Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, supra note 108 (to locate, search 
“Sierra Club” in “Organization’s Name” search bar); id. (to locate, search “Heifer Project 
International” in “Organization’s Name” search bar).  
 112. Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, supra note 108. 
 113. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, pts. IV & V (enumerating access rights of General, 
Special, and Roster consultants to the Council itself and to commissions and other 
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send representatives to sit as observers at meetings of the Council and its 
commissions and other subsidiary bodies, and they may present written and 
sometimes oral comments to international officials in various contexts.114 
Those with General consultative status may even present their own agenda 
items to officials in a number of contexts.115  
Second, in addition to consulting with the Council and its subsidiary 
bodies, consultative status gives organizations broader access within the 
United Nations. Organizations may consult with the U.N. Secretariat “on 
matters in which there is a mutual interest or a mutual concern” at the request 
of either party.116 They may be commissioned by the Secretary-General to 
carry out studies or prepare papers on particular matters.117 They can access 
press release services provided by the United Nations.118 And these 
organizations may obtain general access with U.N. “grounds passes.”119 
Importantly, because consultative status offers consultants access to nonpublic 
areas where governmental delegates and international organization officials 
gather, the status confers plenty of “informal lobbying opportunities.”120 
Third, among the array of privileges afforded to consultants is presump-
tive access to U.N.-sponsored treatymaking conferences and the preparatory 
processes leading up to those conferences—an important point of access for 
consultants to influence the work of international lawmakers.121 Consultants 
are automatically accredited to international conferences (and their 
preparatory processes) simply by expressing their interest to the U.N. 
subsidiary bodies of the Council). Roster organizations have slightly fewer rights. See 
id. ¶¶ 29, 31(e), 31(f), 36, 37(f), 38(b) (providing that Roster organizations may have 
representatives present only at meetings “concerned with matters within their field of 
competence,” may submit longer written statements to the Council only upon request 
of the Council or NGO Committee, may only submit written statements to subsidiary 
bodies upon invitation of the Secretary-General, and may only speak at meetings of the 
commission or other subsidiary organs upon the recommendation of the Secretary-
General and the request of the body in question).   
 114. Id. ¶¶ 29, 30, 32(a); see also Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 267 (reviewing rights for 
General consultants). 
 115. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 28.  
 116. Id. ¶ 65. 
 117. Id. ¶ 66. 
 118. Id. ¶ 67. 
 119. See Accreditation, UNITED NATIONS OFF. AT GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/ngo/
accreditation (last visited Jan. 1, 2017). 
 120. TULLY, supra note 106, at 66. 
 121. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, pt. VII; see also Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability 
in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 203 (2002) (arguing that participation in U.N.-sponsored 
treatymaking “has been essential for NGO influence on international treaties”). 
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Secretariat. No further screening is necessary.122 This saves associations the 
burden of applying separately to every conference and preparatory process 
they wish to attend.123 Consultants, once admitted, do not have a negotiating 
role but can participate in working groups, make written presentations, and 
sometimes even engage in floor debates.124 This is a key benefit of accreditation 
and, as a result of this access right, U.N.-sponsored treaty negotiations or 
conferences now regularly have “a sizeable, sometimes enormous, NGO 
component.”125  
4. The Council’s rules as a blueprint  
What is the significance of Article 71 and the Council’s resulting accredita-
tion regime? Why study this accreditation regime as the focal point for NGOs’ 
access to the work of international lawmakers? Several answers have been 
offered in the preceding paragraphs: the consultancy structure is the only point 
of contact between nonstate associations and the United Nations that is 
regularized in the U.N. Charter, and it offers formal and informal access to 
U.N. officials and national lawmaking delegates at U.N. treaty conferences. 
Consider an additional reason: the Council’s consultancy structure has 
spread far beyond the Council and served as a blueprint for many other 
consultancy regimes at other international organizations.126 These include 
agencies within the U.N. system, such as the WHO and UNESCO, which have 
adopted accreditation rules nearly identical to the Council’s.127 In fact, as the 
 122. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 42 (providing that organizations with consultative 
status “shall as a rule be accredited” to participate at international conferences). 
Accreditation is not guaranteed, but “those non-state actors already possessing 
ECOSOC accreditation enjoy a legitimate expectation of admission.” TULLY, supra note 
106, at 206.  
 123. By contrast, associations that are not consultants must first apply for accreditation to 
each individual conference before receiving admission as observers—requiring them to 
“submit official documents outlining their mandate, scope and governing structure, 
evidence their non-profit status, describe activities suggesting competence and provide 
details of affiliations, funding sources, publications and designated contact points.” 
TULLY, supra note 106, at 205; see also E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶¶ 42-47.  
 124. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶¶ 49-52. 
 125. Raustiala, supra note 107, at 156. 
 126. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 358-59 (“Even though Article 71 refers only to 
ECOSOC, a consultative role for NGOs gradually became an established practice 
throughout the UN system.”). See generally UNITED NATIONS NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
LIAISON SERV., UN SYSTEM ENGAGEMENT WITH NGOS, CIVIL SOCIETY, THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR, AND OTHER ACTORS: A COMPENDIUM (2005), https://www.unngls.org/pdfs/
compendium-2005-withCOVER.pdf (cataloging an array of accreditation regimes 
throughout the U.N. system).  
 127. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 253-55 (noting that UNESCO, the WHO, and the 
(unsuccessful) ITO are among the agencies mirroring the Article 71 consultation 
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United Nations launched its specialized agencies, it usually closely followed the 
Article 71 model and the Council’s implementing rules to define and structure 
relationships with NGOs.128 
While a certain degree of heterogeneity remains among different accredi-
tation structures,129 the Council’s accreditation rules are a meaningful point of 
entry.130 Outside the United Nations, the influence of the Article 71 Council 
regime has spread to institutions as diverse as the Organization of American 
States, the Antarctic Treaty, and the African Union.131 Thus, considering the 
Council’s regime as an exemplar will serve as a useful way to expose the 
problem this Article considers, frame its critique, and model a potential 
solution. And to the extent a reform will be effective for the Council’s 
consultancy structure, it will likely also serve as an effective blueprint for a 
more diverse set of accreditation regimes. 
C. The Rules Apply Oddly and Uneasily to Businesses 
How do businesses fit within the consultancy rules? Quite simply, individ-
ual businesses are excluded. But the rules do not restrain businesses from 
expressing themselves and attempting to wield influence through nonprofits 
formed or used for such a purpose. Although I call this quasi-accommodation 
an odd and uneasy treatment of business entities—a critique I will defend in 
Parts II and III below—this structure would have seemed inevitable to the 
drafters of Article 71 and the early Council rulemakers. This Subpart explains 
the current legal structure and its origins.  
model). Significantly, “Article 71 gave NGOs a hunting license to pursue involvement 
in the U.N. beyond ECOSOC” and served to “codify the custom of NGO participation” 
that had existed in the League of Nations period. Id. at 257-58. 
 128. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 358-59. See generally UNITED NATIONS NON-
GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERV., supra note 126 (summarizing NGO accreditation 
structures at diverse international organizations). 
 129. For an excellent analysis of the features and flaws of the consultation regime of the 
United Nations Commission on Trade Law, as well as an account of efforts to reform 
that consultation regime, see SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB & TERENCE HALLIDAY, GLOBAL 
LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS 
(forthcoming 2017) (ch. 8 manuscript at 2) (on file with author). 
 130. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 249 (“As U.N. specialized agencies were created, they 
generally followed the Article 71 model.”). 
 131. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 359. 
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1. The consultancy rules exclude individual businesses  
Article 71 of the U.N. Charter employs the neutral term “non-
governmental organizations.”132 That term might at first glance seem to 
accommodate for-profit entities just as well as other kinds of NGOs. After all, 
business entities are created by individuals organizing to accomplish a common 
purpose, just as other organizations are. The only distinguishing feature is that 
business organizations have a profit motive. This is a point some commenta-
tors have made outside the Article 71 context: “Walt Disney Co., for example, is 
as much a voluntary association as Amnesty International . . . .”133 But this 
more capacious definition of association, or “organization[],” is likely not what 
the Charter’s drafters intended. As Steve Charnovitz has noted, “[t]he practice 
of excluding commercial organizations from the category of ‘associations’” was 
well established at the time the Charter was drafted.134  
The Council’s accreditation rules eliminated all doubt by making clear that 
individual profit-seeking businesses are excluded.135 The criteria demand that 
an accredited organization be a nonprofit and obtain its funding from “national 
affiliate[] [organizations] . . . or from individual members,” a requirement that 
excludes any associations organized for commercial or profit-making 
purposes—namely, businesses.136 In addition to this requirement, accredited 
organizations must be organized for purposes in conformity with the “spirit, 
purposes and principles” of the United Nations.137 This is to say, in the 
hypothetical world in which the nonprofit criterion did not bar entry, 
businesses would also have to show that their “aims and purposes” support the 
“spirit, purposes and principles” of the U.N. Charter.138 The Council’s website 
describes the groups anticipated by this criterion as “international, regional, 
 132. U.N. Charter art. 71; see also Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 187 n.17 (“The practice of 
excluding commercial organizations from the category of ‘associations’ goes back at 
least to . . . 1910.”). 
 133. Snyder, supra note 80, at 378.  
 134. Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 187 n.17.  
 135. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 13 (“The basic resources of the organization shall be 
derived in the main from contributions of the national affiliates or other components 
or from individual members.”). The rules also require “a democratically adopted 
constitution” and that an organization have “authority to speak for its members 
through its authorized representatives.” Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Businesses may have an argument 
that their corporate charter and shareholder voting structure satisfy these criteria, but 
the rules are designed with other purposes in view, and the paragraph 13 nonprofit 
requirement is dispositive.  
 136. Id. ¶ 13.   
 137. Id. ¶ 2. Other entities excluded by these criteria include governmental or 
intergovernmental organizations, see id. ¶ 12, individuals, see id. ¶ 5, and secessionist or 
other armed groups with governmental ambitions, see id. ¶ 4. 
 138. Id. ¶ 2. 
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sub-regional, national non-governmental organizations, non-profit 
organizations, public sector or voluntary organizations.”139 
Other international organizations that follow the Article 71 accreditation 
template, such as U.N. specialized agencies like the WHO, also exclude 
individual businesses from their consultancy structures. For example, the 
WHO’s parallel to Article 71 “enables it to conclude suitable arrangements with 
nonstate actors in the execution of its mandate”140 but specifies that it may not 
form this official relationship with nonstate actors pursuing “concerns which 
are primarily of a commercial or profit-making nature.”141 Simply put, 
businesses are not granted access to the consultation regime. 
2. But they permit businesses to act through nonprofits 
Although businesses are individually excluded, they are permitted to 
consult through accredited nonprofits. A brief account of the origins of this 
legal structure will frame the critique of its effects, which is to come in Parts II 
and III.  
The story begins even further back in time, in the League of Nations-era in 
the 1920s and 1930s. Article 71—and, in turn, the Council’s rule structure—was 
designed to enshrine the earlier “League Method”142 whereby voluntary 
associations and international organizations had very close working 
relationships.143 As one commentator noted, “[b]ehind many [early 
international organizations] stood idealistic and active NGOs.”144  
 139. Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status, supra note 20. The Council’s brochure, which 
explains consultative status to potential applicants, certainly affirms a general sense 
that consultative status is meant for small, hardworking public interest groups: the 
brochure is replete with photographs of a diverse array of people, some in native attire 
and others in T-shirts emblazoned with activist slogans, nary a corporate suit to be 
found. See UNITED NATIONS, WORKING WITH ECOSOC: AN NGOS GUIDE TO 
CONSULTATIVE STATUS (2011), http://csonet.org/content/documents/Brochure.pdf. 
 140. TULLY, supra note 106, at 68. 
 141. World Health Org. [WHO], World Health Assembly Res. 40.25, ¶ 3.1 (Jan. 23, 1987), in 
BASIC DOCUMENTS 97, 98 (48th ed. 2014), http://apps.who.int/gb/bd. Even the 
UNFCCC—which includes the distinct category “BINGO” or “Business and Industry 
NGO” as a particular type of constituency group within its larger pool of observer 
organizations—explicitly requires that admitted organizations be nonprofit NGOs, not 
individual business entities. See Tully, supra note 64, at 15-16. 
 142. Rainer Lagoni & Eleni Chaitidou, Article 71, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 
A COMMENTARY 1068, 1070 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (explaining that 
Article 71 was an attempt to codify the “usual practice” of the League of Nations).  
 143. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 245 (describing the League-era context in which 
voluntary associations defined and presented issues for the League’s consideration; 
served as “insiders working directly with government officials and international civil 
servants to address” international problems, principally through policy conferences; 
and lobbied those in power). Indeed, voluntary, issue-oriented associations became 
active in influencing international law long before the League period, “emerg[ing] at 
footnote continued on next page 
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In that era, there was no strong distinction between voluntary associations 
that advanced business or commercial ends and those that lobbied for other 
causes.145 Rather, associations advancing business interests were among these 
influential early NGOs. They contributed to the development of international 
organizations, participated in meetings, and helped draft international 
treaties.146 According to Steve Charnovitz’s masterful historical account of 
NGO involvement in the work of the United Nations, the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) took its place among the top three most 
significant associations in the League period (together with the Red Cross and 
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom).147 Business 
associations also participated in the League’s work relating to finance, 
commercial law, transportation, and pharmaceuticals, among other things.148  
However, the League did draw a distinction between, on the one hand, 
“public, semi-public and private organizations” (terms that correspond to 
modern-day NGOs and international organizations) and, on the other, 
“organizations with a commercial objective.”149 For example, the League 
included only the former (noncommercial) organizations in a directory of 
international organizations and in publications dedicated to aggregating policy 
recommendations.150 Thus during the League period, individual businesses and 
entities pursuing commercial purposes were excluded as informal consultants 
to the League of Nations while associations of businesses were included. 
Because Article 71 of the U.N. Charter and the resulting Council regime 
were meant to continue the League practice, the criteria for accreditation 
maintained those earlier distinctions. The term “non-governmental 
organization,” or “NGO,” was itself coined at the birth of the United Nations 
the end of the eighteenth century, and [becoming] international by 1850.” Id. at 212. “By 
the end of the nineteenth century, there was a pattern of private international 
cooperation evolving into public international action.” Id. 
 144. Id. at 212. 
 145. Id. at 245 (noting that one of the major successes of this period was the International 
Labour Organization, which engaged business and labor groups as full and equal 
participants).  
 146. See, e.g., id. at 202 (noting that railway businesses helped form the International Railway 
Congress Association, which led to the creation of the intergovernmental Central 
Office for International Railway Transport); id. at 211 (“[T]he International Telegraph 
Union invited private companies to participate in its meetings.”). 
 147. See id. at 212-13, 223, 245-46 (noting that the ICC even “gained official roles” in League-
sponsored economic conferences). 
 148. Id. at 222-27. 
 149. Id. at 221.  
 150. See id. (“The League . . . published[] the Handbook of International Organizations . . . [which] 
included public, semi-public, and private organizations, but excluded organizations 
with a commercial objective.”).  
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and the drafting of Article 71.151 The term was meant, as its name suggests, to 
set aside government-sponsored organizations.152 It reflects the primary 
preoccupation of the drafters, who did not seek to distinguish between 
different types of voluntary associations—those associations that advanced 
business aims on the one hand and public interest associations on the other.153 
Rather, the drafters were concerned about whether to allow national NGOs to 
serve as consultants (in addition to international NGOs) because of a concern 
that this would allow U.N. entanglement in domestic affairs.154 
Associations of businesses began to consult with the United Nations as 
they had with the League. For example, the ICC became one of the first 
associations accredited with the Council.155 Moreover, after the Council’s 1996 
rules change, the ICC became one of the comparatively small number of 
organizations that received the coveted General consultative status, giving it 
the broadest available consultation rights.156 The ICC has made use of this 
status at the Council to engage in a broad array of activities, including 
“organiz[ing] study groups, collaborat[ing] with the International Law 
Association and prepar[ing] legal drafts.”157 It has, in fact, taken a “catalytical 
role within the international legal process for producing documents that are 
ultimately adopted” as legally binding on nations.158 
 
*     *      * 
 
While a whole bevy of supporters and critics has focused its attention on 
the role of NGOs as international consultants, one important aspect of the legal 
structure has gone underexamined and underappreciated. That aspect is the 
way businesses—profit-seeking entities—fit within the consultancy system—
 151. See id. at 186 & n.14. 
 152. See id. at 186. 
 153. See TULLY, supra note 106, at 66 (“Although subsuming corporations within the NGO 
category suppresses important distinctions, equality of status for the purposes of 
counterbalancing competing perspectives was preferred to differential access or 
treatment to exploit operational specialization.”). 
 154. Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 252-53; see also Hobe, supra note 84, ¶ 7, at 1792 (noting 
that “the language of Art. 71 supports the view that the focus is primarily on establish-
ing relations between the UN and international NGOs” and, as such, indicates that 
national NGOs should only have contingent access). 
 155. See TULLY, supra note 106, at 66. 
 156. Id. at 66-67. 
 157. Id. at 67. 
 158. Id.; see also id. (pointing out that treaty negotiations sometimes involve “ICC drafts 
sponsored by developed states”). 
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specifically, how the consultancy rules apply to businesses and what the 
resulting effect is on business behavior.  
This Part has offered a legal analysis to answer that question. Simply put, 
business entities may not become accredited as consultants. That is, they may 
not become accredited as individual, profit-seeking business entities. However, 
they may influence international lawmakers through proxies, channeling their 
lobbying activity through nonprofit associations, which may themselves 
become accredited. But this black-letter-law answer reveals even deeper 
puzzles. Specifically, what is the effect of this odd legal structure on business 
activity? And—crucially—what are the effects of this structure and the 
resulting business activity on international lawmaking? As Part II argues, the 
consultancy rules have in effect funneled business influence into NGOs, 
producing an array of harmful results. 
II. Astroturf Activism  
“Astroturf activism,” in this Article’s usage, describes the phenomenon 
whereby business entities gain access to international lawmakers through 
front groups that obscure the identity of the profit-seeking enterprise that is 
really the relevant actor.159 This happens most starkly when business 
organizations capture an existing NGO or form their own NGO with 
nonprofit status and a mission statement that obscures the company’s true 
interests. It also happens when powerful businesses capture trade associations 
that purport to speak on behalf of a wider range of actors in a particular 
industry. The phenomenon may also capture the scenario where for-profit 
entities escape the notice of gatekeepers and become accredited, notwithstand-
ing their noncompliance with accreditation eligibility rules.  
A brief note at the outset: this conceptual framework is an oversimplifica-
tion. The simplicity, however, is useful. It focuses attention on the relevant 
features of the phenomenon, the features of the consultancy laws that have 
facilitated it, and starting points for reform. Because the astroturf activism 
phenomenon has not received systematic attention, even the basic framework 
illuminates important problems and frames existing questions. 
This Part turns to those questions, first identifying methods businesses use 
to obtain access to lawmakers through the consultancy system and classifying 
those methods into a three-part taxonomy. Businesses gain access by:  
(1) continuing the League of Nations-era practice of working through 
traditional trade and industry associations; (2) defying the rules and exploiting 
gatekeeping weaknesses to become accredited as individual market 
participants; and (3) mimicking or capturing typical public interest-oriented, 
 159. For a discussion of other uses of the term “astroturf activism,” see note 9 above. 
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civil society NGOs.160 These responses bring an array of problems—which this 
Part identifies as issues of transparency and access—some predictable and some 
surprising.  
A. Identifying the Phenomenon 
The analysis that follows draws from a variety of sources, using both 
primary and secondary materials to compile a preliminary study and import 
insights from business and popular literatures into law.  
The principal source of primary materials is the Council’s own library of 
resources, which the Council makes available in an online database.161 The 
database contains basic information on all organizations that have obtained 
consultancy status, which is principally gleaned from the application materials 
organizations submit when they apply to be accredited as consultants. Building 
on those primary materials, this Article contributes additional due diligence, 
reporting the results of an original investigation to determine the context of 
some of the claims in the application materials and the identities of individuals 
and entities named. The results of this investigation are presented in a series of 
case studies, which are meant to expose the basic contours of business access 
and lay a foundation for further study. 
B.  Modes of Access 
The descriptive analysis that follows moves through modes of access from 
the most transparent to the most covert. 
1. Industry and trade associations 
The first mode of business access is through trade and industry associa-
tions. While these associations explicitly advance business agendas,162 they are 
themselves organized as nonprofit entities and so are eligible for accreditation 
with the Council. In fact, the practice of accrediting industry and trade 
associations is quite historically grounded, with roots in pre-U.N. League of 
Nations relationships.163 The practice is also relatively extensive. Of the 
 160. The tripartite approach to obtaining access is, of course, the aggregated product of 
decisions by many different business actors, rather than of a monolithic entity with a 
unitary agenda, as tempting as it may be to draw that simplified caricature.  
161. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, NGO BRANCH: DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., 
http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayAdvancedSearch.do?method=search&
sessionCheck=false (last visited Jan. 1, 2017). 
 162. TULLY, supra note 106, at 207 (“[A] legitimate and recognized purpose of trade 
associations is to defend and advance the interests of enterprises they represent.”). 
 163. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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approximately 4600 associations that had obtained accreditation as consultants 
with the Council as of September 2016, 458—or approximately 10%—selected 
“business and industry” as an area of expertise and field of activity.164 That 
figure likely does not represent the complete number of associations that 
advance business or industry interests; it is merely the number that explicitly 
acknowledge this focus. 
While these associations also had the option to elect that they were 
“private sector” organizations, the vast majority did not, preferring the more 
traditional term “NGO.”165 This is true even of organizations that overtly 
advance private sector interests, such as the Confederation of European Paper 
Industries.166  
In fact, the titles and descriptions of many of these organizations in the 
Council’s database suggest that they are characterizing their activities so as to 
amplify the public interest, non-profit-driven aspects of their work and de-
emphasize their roles as spokespeople for profit-seeking businesses.167 For 
example, the World Coal Association, afforded Special accreditation in 1991, 
seeks to “[d]eepen and broaden understanding amongst policy makers and key 
stakeholders of the positive role of coal in addressing global warming, 
widespread poverty in developing countries, and energy security.”168 The 
 164. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, supra note 161 (to locate, search by 
selecting all options from the “Organization’s Type” field; then select all options from 
the “Consultative Status” field; and then expand the “Areas of Expertise & Fields of 
Activity” field and select “Economic and Social” and then “Business and Industry”) 
[hereinafter Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search]. 
These numbers are current as of September 30, 2016.  
 165. Only three out of the 458 associations that selected “business and industry” as their area 
of expertise indicated that their organization type was “private sector.” Advanced Search 
for Civil Society Organizations, supra note 161 (to locate, search by selecting “Private 
Sector” from the “Organization’s Type” field; then select all options from the “Consulta-
tive Status” field; and then expand the “Areas of Expertise & Fields of Activity” field and 
select “Economic and Social” and then “Business and Industry”) [hereinafter Advanced 
Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search]. The 
three were the World Coal Association, Freann Financial Services Limited, and the 
United States Sustainable Development Corporation. Id. 
 166. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “Confederation of European Paper Industries” hyperlink). 
 167. To be sure, it is one of the requirements of the accreditation process that these 
associations have “aims and purposes” that support the “spirit, purposes and principles” 
of the United Nations, and the associations must demonstrate that their work 
promotes the work of the U.N. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶¶ 2-3. However, 
these associations appear to be taking pains to establish that they promote more than 
just the economic work of the United Nations. 
 168. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, 
supra note 165 (to locate, select the “World Coal Association” hyperlink and then select 
“Activities” under the “Profile” tab). For accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil 
Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, supra note 165. 
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National Association of Home Builders of the United States (NAHB), which 
obtained Special status in 2011, represents the U.S. homebuilding industry.169 It 
serves both bigger corporate members and smaller state and local builders 
associations, but it affirms that one of its primary goals is to “provid[e] and 
expand[] opportunities for all people to have safe, decent, and affordable 
housing.”170  
Both of these organizations, while highlighting their public interest goals 
in their U.N. applications, also reveal that they are principally engaged in 
lobbying government officials to advance the financial interests of their 
members. The World Coal Association lists among its goals that it aims to 
“[a]ssist in the creation of a political climate supportive of action by 
governments” to use various kinds of coal technologies as part of “national and 
regional energy portfolios” and to educate relevant communities and 
policymakers about the benefits of coal and the coal industry.171 The NAHB, 
likewise, seeks to “[b]alance legislative, regulatory and judicial public policy” 
and “[i]mprove[] [the] business performance of its members.”172 
Many of the 458 associations that claim “business and industry” as an area 
of expertise and field of activity advance the interests of a particular industry 
or a particular economic sector. A few examples will illuminate the kinds of 
groups included: 
x The World Nuclear Association, afforded Roster accreditation in 1993, 
“is the global private-sector organization that seeks to promote the 
peaceful worldwide use of nuclear power.”173 The organization’s web-
site claims that its “members are responsible for virtually all of world 
uranium mining, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication; all re-
actor vendors; major nuclear engineering, construction, and waste 
 169. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “National Association of Home Builders of the United States” 
hyperlink and then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). For accreditation year, 
see Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra 
note 164. 
 170. See Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “National Association of Home Builders of the United States” 
hyperlink and then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 171. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, 
supra note 165 (to locate, select the “World Coal Association” hyperlink and then select 
“Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 172. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “National Association of Home Builders of the United States” 
hyperlink and then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 173. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “World Nuclear Association” hyperlink and then select 
“Activities” under the “Profile” tab). For accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil 
Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 164. 
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management companies; and most of the world’s nuclear genera-
tion.”174 
x The Asociacion Regional de Empresas de Petroleo y Gas Natural en 
Latinoamerica y el Caribe is an Uruguay-based NGO that obtained 
Special consultative status in 1976.175 Members of the organization are 
thirty-two national and international oil, gas, and biofuel companies 
and institutions, including many major energy corporations like 
Chevron, Petrobras, Repsol, and Spectrum.176 One of the organiza-
tion’s principal purposes is to “promote and facilitate the industry’s . . . 
improvement in their operational . . . and economic performance” in 
addition to social, environmental, and collaborative goals.177 
x The American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA) successfully 
achieved Roster accreditation in 1996.178 While the AF&PA is alleged-
ly “[i]nternational” in geographic scope, its self-declared purpose is to 
“sustain[] and enhance[] the interests of the US forest products indus-
try.”179 The organization’s mission statement, per its website homep-
age, is to successfully influence public policy to benefit the U.S. paper 
and forest products industry.180 Members of AF&PA include U.S. lum-
ber, timber, and paper products companies.181 The European equiva-
lent—the Confederation of European Paper Industries—also received 
 174. World Nuclear Association Members, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://world-nuclear.org/
our-association/membership/our-members.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2017); see also id. 
(“Other members provide international services in nuclear transport, law, insurance, 
brokerage, industry analysis and finance.”). 
 175. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select “Asociacion Regional de Empresas de Petroleo y Gas Natural en 
Latinoamerica y el Caribe”). For accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil Society 
Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 164. 
 176. Member Companies, REGIONAL ASS’N OIL, GAS & BIOFUELS SECTOR COMPANIES LATIN AM. 
& CARIBBEAN, https://arpel.org/actual-members (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).  
 177. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select “Asociacion Regional de Empresas de Petroleo y Gas Natural en 
Latinoamerica y el Caribe” and then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 178. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164.  
 179. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “American Forest and Paper Association” hyperlink and then 
select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 180. Mission and Vision, AM. FOREST & PAPER ASS’N, http://www.afandpa.org/about/
mission-and-vision (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).  
 181. Membership Directory, AM. FOREST & PAPER ASS’N, http://www.afandpa.org/about/
membership-directory (last updated Oct. 12, 2016). 
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Roster accreditation, in 2004.182 Members are pulp and paper industry 
associations of EU member states.183 
x The European Association of Automotive Suppliers, which received 
Roster status in 2002, is “[t]he voice of the automotive supply industry 
in Europe . . . representing an industry with . . . more than 3000 com-
panies . . . and covering all products and services within the automo-
tive supply chain.”184 The industry claims a €600 billion annual 
turnover.185  
x The Association of Latin American Railways (ALAF) received Roster 
status in 1999.186 According to its website, ALAF represents most rail-
way companies in Latin America.187  
Together with these industry- or sector-specific associations, others 
among the 458 “business and industry”-promoting associations advance the 
interests of business more generally. It has already been noted that the ICC was 
one of the first organizations to receive General consultative status, and it did 
so as soon as the Council’s accreditation regime was developed in 1946.188 More 
recently, other business-promoting organizations have joined the ranks. For 
example: 
x The World Union of Small and Medium Enterprises (the Union) 
obtained Special status in 2013.189 The Union’s objectives are to “assist 
Member Institutions in their dealings with national policy and . . . rep-
resent the interests of [Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)] at In-
ternational—and United Nations—Organisations . . . in the event of 
global economic crisis and the challenges and problems of SMEs in the 
 182. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164.  
 183. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “Confederation of European Paper Industries” hyperlink and 
then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 184. EUR. ASS’N AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIERS, http://clepa.eu (last visited Jan. 1, 2017). For 
accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and 
Industry Search, supra note 164. 
 185. EUR. ASS’N AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIERS, supra note 184. 
 186. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164. 
 187. Quienes Somos, ASS’N LATIN AM. RAILWAYS, http://www.alaf.int.ar/acerca-de-alaf.php 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2017). 
 188. See supra Part I.C.2.  
 189. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164. 
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21st Century.”190 The stated goal of the organization is to lobby on 
behalf of these small and medium enterprises; it states that it will “effi-
ciently and effectively contribute to present proposals for solutions 
and reforms on a regional level that can improve the business envi-
ronment for SMEs.”191 
x The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists 
(Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu), which gained 
Special accreditation status in 2013, aims, as its name suggests, to pro-
mote Turkish businesses.192 It seeks to “make [Turkish] enterprises 
and entrepreneurs a part of the global world of business.”193 Interest-
ingly, the organization identifies itself to the Council as a trade union, 
even though it appears to support business executives.194  
x The Confédération Européenne des Cadres CEC, which received 
Special accreditation status in 2012, likewise identifies itself to the 
Council as a trade union, although it also supports managers and exec-
utives.195 The Confederation “has implemented an international man-
agers’ network” and aims “[t]o express and defend the needs and points 
of view of managers on current topics.”196  
2. For-profit entities 
According to the Council’s regulations implementing U.N. Charter Article 
71, consulting organizations must be nonprofits.197 That is, organizations must 
 190. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “World Union of Small Enterprises” hyperlink and then select 
“Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 191. Id. The Union does not seek to obscure its intentions as a lobbying organization, 
offering as an additional objective that it will “[e]stablish itself as the premier interna-
tional organisation advocating the interests of micro-, small, and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) at relevant international fora, before all national, regional and international 
bodies and with leading media that shape public opinion.” Id. 
 192. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164.  
 193. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu” hyperlink 
and then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 194. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu” hyper-
link). 
 195. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “Confédération Européenne des Cadres CEC” hyperlink). 
 196. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “Confédération Européenne des Cadres CEC” hyperlink and 
then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab).  
 197. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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obtain their fees from members or local affiliate organizations and not from 
participation in commerce as for-profit entities.198 Nevertheless, some 
companies appear to have flouted these rules and obtained accreditation despite 
funding from the sale of goods or services or the fact that they are organized as 
for-profit entities. In fact, at least one commentator claims that the gatekeeping 
for consultancy status is quite lax.199 
For example, Freann Financial Services Limited, an organization that 
received Special accreditation status in 2013, has as its mission, among other 
goals, “[t]o provide lease or hire purchase financing to the private sector,” “to 
underwrite larger financing type transactions,” and “[t]o provide management 
advisory and consultancy services for its clients and other potential 
customers.”200 The company records its funding structure as “[p]roduct sales 
and business services” as well as fees for consulting and research services.201 
The company appears to have “aims and purposes” in line with those of the 
United Nations in that the capital it provides is directed to development, often 
through microfinance, and the company is focused on green financing and 
increasing financial literacy.202 However, the company does not fit within the 
traditional definition of an NGO, as its funding source indicates that it 
generates fees for services and sells financial products.203 And, in other 
respects, the company behaves like a business. It has, for example, signed on to 
the U.N. Global Compact, which categorizes it as a small or medium enterprise 
in the financial services sector.204  
Another example of an entity that fits oddly under the “NGO” moniker is 
an organization called the United States Sustainable Development Corporation 
(USSDC).205 The organization, which received Special consultative status in 
 198. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 13. 
 199. See TULLY, supra note 106, at 207.  
 200. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, 
supra note 165 (to locate, select the “Freann Financial Services Limited” hyperlink and 
then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab).  
 201. Id.  
 202. See Letter from Kwabena Anning Frederick, Exec. Dir., Freann Fin. Servs. Ltd., to Dir., 
U.N. Glob. Compact (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/
attachments/cop_2015/188491/original/COMMUNICATION_OF_PROGRESS_-
_UN_GLOBAL_COMPACT_2015.pdf?1442243255.  
 203. See Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry 
Search, supra note 165 (to locate, select the “Freann Financial Services Limited” 
hyperlink and then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 204. Freann Financial Services Limited, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants/29061 (last visited Jan. 1, 
2017). 
 205. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, 
supra note 165.  
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2015, calls itself a “[p]rivate sector” organization rather than an NGO.206 The 
organization is involved in sustainable development, with a mission to “find 
creative approaches to stimulate the local economy.”207 It particularly attends 
to impoverished regions of the United States “through job creation and 
business development.”208 While many of these purposes seem consistent with 
the aims and purposes of the United Nations, the USSDC is organized in the 
United States as a for-profit corporation, incorporated in the commonwealth of 
Virginia in 2011.209 The company is funded through fees for consulting and 
research services.210 Notably, when the USSDC’s application came before the 
Council’s Committee on NGOs, the Committee granted the application (and 
therefore consultative status) without any comment.211 In particular, the 
committee did not note or consider the alleged NGO’s for-profit corporate 
status or the fact that it functions as a consulting firm.212 
For other organizations, funding is obtained through mixed sources, and it 
is difficult to determine whether the entity has registered domestically as a 
nonprofit or for-profit entity. For example, the Turkish Confederation of 
Businessmen and Industrialists—a Special accreditation consultant since 
2013213—reports the usual sources of funding for an NGO: that is, membership 
fees and “[d]onations and grants from domestic sources.”214 But the 
Confederation also reports income from “[p]roduct sales and business services” 
and “[f]ees for providing consulting or research services.”215  
Freann Financial Services, the USSDC, and the Turkish Confederation 
serve as evidence of the fact that the nonprofit criterion is at best inadequately 
 206. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, 
supra note 165 (to locate, select the “United States Sustainable Development Corpora-
tion” hyperlink). For accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil Society Organiza-
tions: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, supra note 165. 
 207. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, 
supra note 165 (to locate, select the “United States Sustainable Development Corpora-
tion” hyperlink and then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Governmental Orgs. on Its 2015 
Resumed Session, U.N. Doc. E/2015/32 (Part II) (June 17, 2015). 
 212. That is to say, the minutes of the meeting record no mention of the for-profit status of 
this organization. See id. 
 213. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164. 
 214. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 
164 (to locate, select the “Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu” hyperlink 
and then select “Activities” under the “Profile” tab). 
 215. Id. 
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enforced, permitting some businesses access to the consultancy regime directly 
through channels meant for NGOs. 
3. Grassroots mimicry and capture 
The third mode of business access to the consultancy system is the one to 
which the term “astroturf activism” most clearly applies: grassroots mimicry 
and capture. Businesses form associations that appear to be dedicated to 
nonprofit, public-regarding causes but are, in fact, mouthpieces for covert 
business agendas. Alternatively, businesses capture existing associations by 
placing corporate officers on NGO boards, funneling donations, offering 
revolving door incentives, or creating partnerships that eviscerate the NGOs’ 
power to act independently. These tactics can result in mixed agendas that 
render the organizations’ intentions and loyalties unclear. The result is 
organizations with names like “Citizens for Sensible Control of Acid Rain” 
(formed by coal and electricity companies);216 the “National Wetlands 
Coalition” (serving U.S. oil companies and real estate developers);217 
“Consumers for World Trade” (formed by an industry coalition);218 and, in the 
example that opened this paper, “Center for Indoor Air Research” (captured by 
the tobacco industry).219  
This third mode of access, as the least transparent, is also the most chal-
lenging to uncover and map. Discerning this mode of access requires gathering 
evidence from diverse primary and secondary sources and stitching it together, 
a process that requires inferential leaps. Because this Article is the first to focus 
analytical attention on the astroturf activism phenomenon within the 
consultancy system, this account, preliminary as it is, nevertheless serves a 
useful purpose. It exposes this important issue, frames the critique to follow, 
and lays a foundation for a future, more systematic empirical analysis. 
It appears that businesses began to use NGO mimicry and capture to gain 
access to the consultancy regime right around the time of the 1996 rules change 
at the Council that liberalized the access rules—the change implemented by 
Resolution 1996/31.220 At that time, businesses seemed to be beginning to note 
that NGOs had access to international decisionmaking processes—and 
 216. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 489. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 48. Though the source uses 
the phrase “Center for Indoor Air Quality,” “Center for Indoor Air Research” is the 
correct term as listed in the Glossary. See id. at 245. 
 220. See supra Part I.B. 
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therefore influence over those processes—in a way that businesses did not.221 
The business literature noted that, at least in the environmental context, 
businesses had begun to copy the NGO format and “behav[e] like NGOs” in 
order to accomplish a number of goals, including obtaining access to U.N. 
lawmaking processes and helping to set international agendas.222 The 
literature recommended that businesses appropriate the NGO format to mimic 
the success of NGOs in obtaining access to international decisionmaking 
processes and influencing international policy.223  
At the same time, Robert Fri in 1992 acknowledged business’s uneasy fit 
within the NGO rubric.224 Fri noted that while business entities are certainly 
nongovernmental—and familiar with the practice of banding together to 
advocate for their common positions—they had not been typically interested in 
advancing broader policy agendas at the international level, at least in the 
environmental area.225 While businesses were familiar with the rules of the 
game in the Washington, D.C. lobbying context, businesses were at the time 
unfamiliar with the realm of international policy in which NGOs were 
operating.226 And yet business leaders were starting to note that those NGOs 
were pushing policies that could have a “profound[]” effect on business 
interests227:  
What [business leaders] saw, of course, was that policies profoundly affecting 
their operations were being shaped outside the system in which they operated. . . . 
 221. Fri, supra note 22, at 92 (noting that the fact that NGOs had been so successful at 
defining agendas—particularly with respect to climate change—was “not lost on at least 
some business leaders”). 
 222. Id. at 93. 
 223. See id. 
 224. Fri’s colorful description demonstrates how striking it must have been at the time that 
business would appropriate the NGO format:  
The notion of the corporation as a nongovernment organization (NGO) doesn’t quite 
pass the “duck” test for most of us. . . . [B]usiness looks like an NGO duck, since most corpora-
tions are nongovernmental. It even walks like a duck, for like any good NGO, business 
organizations are forever scurrying about to form coalitions to advance their shared positions 
on one issue or another. 
But . . . [a]t least on energy and environmental issues that have been so prominent on the 
public policy agenda for the past 20 years, business has rarely been a voice for change. . . . 
[Instead it] regarded environmental protection as a costly compliance problem best left to 
lobbyists and lawyers. 
  Id. at 91 (formatting altered). 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. at 91-92 (noting that businesses could learn from NGOs the skills for “operat[ing] 
outside the established political and economic system” to “identify issues that belong on 
the official agenda, define policies . . . , and organize” to bring these issues to the 
attention of deciders). 
 227. Id. at 92. 
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. . . It seems likely that this realization played a major role in leading business to 
find ways to participate, essentially as an NGO, in the new extra-system game. 
And so it did, both by gaining access to the preparations for [the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development] and the parallel climate 
negotiating process, and by forming its own organizations . . . to play the NGO 
role.228  
Thus, in Fri’s account, the realization that an important lobbying game was 
being played outside of the traditional channels likely led to an uptick in 
business interest in forming NGOs to advance its own interests.229 Fri 
concluded in 1992 that business lobbying at the domestic level “seem[ed] not to 
give business the scope it needs to do the things it wants,” and so he found it 
plausible that “the curious sight of business as an NGO is here to stay.”230 In 
another article in the same business journal in the early 1990s, Larry Susskind 
echoed Fri’s remarks but focused specifically on the “UN-sponsored system of 
environmental treaty-making.”231 Business leaders should, Susskind argued, 
get involved to assist the United Nations in making better treaties, whether or 
not they supported the expansion of domestic or international environmental 
regulation.232  
There is evidence that businesses took up that early 1990s charge and 
began forming or appropriating NGOs to advance their interests within the 
consultancy system at the Council and elsewhere. The Tobacco Report, for 
instance, shows that tobacco companies, to avoid credibility limitations, “have 
frequently used surrogates in their attempts to influence the WHO’s tobacco 
control activities.”233 These surrogates include “a variety of front organiza-
tions,” some of which were existing organizations that the tobacco industry 
funded and groomed for its use.234  
For example, the tobacco industry insiders transformed the International 
Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA) “from an underfunded and disorganized 
group of tobacco farmers into a highly effective lobbying organization.”235 
Tobacco industry insiders noted that the ITGA could be useful because it was 
perceived as a coalition of farmers who were independent from the rest of the 
tobacco industry—that is, the large tobacco companies responsible for 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 94. 
 231. Lawrence E. Susskind, New Corporate Roles in Global Environmental Treaty-Making, 
COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Fall & Winter 1992, at 62, 63.  
 232. Id. at 66, 71. 
 233. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 47.  
 234. Id. 
 235. Id.  
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producing and marketing products for consumers.236 The plan was for the 
ITGA to “get fully accredited observer status at the [Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the U.N. (FAO)]” and serve as a “front for our third world 
lobby activities at WHO.”237 In serving in this capacity, the tobacco companies 
concluded specifically that the ITGA’s “integrity and independence are of great 
potential value.”238 In transforming the ITGA into a “pro-active, politically 
effective organisation, the industry created the opportunity to capture the 
moral high ground in relation to a number of fundamental tobacco-related 
issues.”239 The ITGA did in fact lobby the FAO, the World Bank, and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “to oppose or 
undermine WHO tobacco control activities.”240 
Other organizations, the Tobacco Report found, were formed specifically 
for the purpose of advancing tobacco industry interests. For example, the 
Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) was “an ostensibly independent 
scientific organization actually created by US tobacco companies”241 that 
proposed and funded counterresearch to challenge studies linking tobacco with 
cancer.242 Other examples the Tobacco Report disclosed were the Institute for 
International Health and Development, Associates for Research in the Science 
of Enjoyment, and LIBERTAD.243 The Tobacco Report also noted that it found 
“such a considerable body of evidence pointing to use of other organizations 
with undisclosed relationships to tobacco companies, that is it [sic] likely that 
the committee has identified only a small proportion of the organizations that 
have such undisclosed relationships.”244  
Turning the clock forward to the present day, evidence of corporate 
mimicry or capture of grassroots NGOs—or at a minimum very cozy 
collaboration with them—persists. Some observe that these relationships are 
increasing, perhaps driven by the fact that the ever-proliferating NGOs must 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. (quoting Memorandum from John Bloxcidge to Board Members, British Am. 
Tobacco Co. ¶ 1.4, at 1, ¶ 3.3, at 2 (Oct. 11, 1988) (on file with the University of 
California, San Francisco Library)). 
 238. Id. (quoting Memorandum from John Bloxcidge, supra note 237, ¶ 1.1, at 1). 
 239. Id. (quoting Letter from Martin Oldman, Assistant Sec’y-Gen., Int’l Tobacco Info. Ctr., 
to Gaye Pedlow, British Am. Tobacco Co. 2 (Mar. 13, 1991) (on file with the University 
of California, San Francisco Library)). 
 240. Id. at 48. 
 241. Id. at 201. The CIAR was later disbanded under the terms of a settlement agreement 
between many U.S. state attorneys general and the tobacco companies. Id. 
 242. Id. at 51.  
 243. Id. at 48. 
 244. Id. 
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secure funding to maintain their activities,245 even when corporate support 
might produce mission drift or a legitimacy price tag.246  
For example, in a revealing piece of investigative journalism, Fairouz El 
Tom conducted a review of the “[t]op 100 NGOs”247 as identified by the Global 
Journal.248 El Tom investigated links between these “[t]op 100 NGOs” and the 
tobacco, weapons, and finance industries.249 Specifically, El Tom found in 2013 
that of these one hundred NGOs, 54% had at least one board member affiliated 
with the tobacco industry, 56% with the arms industry, and 59% with the 
finance industry.250 Of the top one hundred NGOs in the study, 40% have 
obtained accreditation at the Council.251 El Tom’s 2015 follow-up highlighted 
accredited organizations with clear links to major corporate partners. For 
example, CARE International, an NGO with General consultancy status,252 has 
a partnership with corporate agricultural giant Cargill (ostensibly to combat 
poverty),253 and Vital Voices, an NGO with Special consultancy status,254 has a 
close relationship with Walmart (ostensibly to increase economic opportuni-
ties for women).255 In El Tom’s estimate, these “[f]igures reveal a clear 
disjunction between the world NGOs seek to create, and the world their 
 245. See Nuria Molina-Gallart, Strange Bedfellows?: NGO-Corporate Relations in International 
Development; An NGO Perspective, 1 DEV. STUD. RES. 42, 43-44 (2014) (noting that NGO 
and corporate partnerships are increasing and arguing that this increase may be borne 
of NGO financial constraints).  
 246. See Kultida Samabuddhi, Money Can Taint NGO’s Clean Image, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Mar. 4, 
2011), https://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/introduction/49912-money-can-taint-ngos 
-clean-image.html (noting that corporate partnerships can raise suspicion for NGOs, as 
critics worry that corporate sponsorship will produce NGO mission drift). 
 247. El Tom, supra note 21. 
 248. See The Top 100 NGOs: A Complete List, GLOBAL J., Jan. & Feb. 2013, at 90, 90-91; see also 
NEW TOP 500 NGOS, http://www.top500ngos.net/the-new-top-500-ngos (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2017) (updating and expanding list of top NGOs in 2015). 
 249. El Tom, supra note 21 (finding that over half of the “[t]op 100 NGOs” in her study had 
one or more board members “affiliated with companies that invest in, or provide . . . 
services to the arms, tobacco and finance industries”); see also Fairouz El Tom, Annual 
NGO Ranking Shows “White Savior” Status Quo Remains Intact, NONPROFIT Q. (May 26, 
2015) [hereinafter El Tom, White Savior], http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/05/26/
annual-ngo-ranking-shows-white-savior-status-quo-remains-intact (updating the 
study for the top NGOs on the Global Journal’s 2015 list).  
 250. El Tom, supra note 21. In a 2015 update, El Tom concluded again that “over half” the 
top one hundred NGOs had corporate links to tobacco, arms, or finance. El Tom, White 
Savior, supra note 249.  
 251. For Council accreditation status, see Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, 
supra note 161. 
 252. See id.  
 253. See El Tom, White Savior, supra note 249.  
 254. See Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, supra note 161.  
 255. See El Tom, White Savior, supra note 249. 
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governance structures reproduce,”256 as links with corporate interests “appear 
to be inconsistent with [the NGOs’] mandate or public identity.”257 Other 
questionable links between NGOs and business partners have garnered 
controversy. For example, Conservation International, a U.S. environmental 
charity, sustained criticism for close links with corporate partners including 
Cargill, Chevron, Monsanto, and Shell.258 Conservation International 
nevertheless obtained Special consultative status at the Council in 2014, several 
years after the controversial links were reported in the press.259 
In short, this third mode of business access to the consultancy system is 
what I have called “grassroots mimicry and capture” because it involves 
businesses either forming sham or front groups that appear to be classic NGOs 
or co-opting existing NGOs to serve as corporate mouthpieces. Because this 
form of access is the most covert of the three described in this Article, it is the 
most difficult to identify. It could also be the form most challenging to regulate, 
as NGOs are dependent for their existence on funding and, for many, corporate 
sponsorship offers a ready source of funding.260 The next Subpart addresses the 
potential harms a regulatory response must address. 
C. Types of Harm 
The three forms of astroturf activism outlined above reveal a number of 
different issues that can be organized broadly into problems of transparency 
and access. As for transparency problems, the fact that the identities of the 
actors driving the agenda are obscured (an opacity problem) renders more 
complex the more common problem that it is difficult to determine an 
organization’s mission and, in turn, its fidelity to that mission (a mission 
accountability problem). These problems make it challenging for gatekeepers to 
do their job, which perhaps explains the fact that those gatekeepers have 
largely avoided excluding organizations for opacity or mission accountability 
issues (a gatekeeping problem). Finally, a legal regime that forces nonprofit 
organizations either to engage in astroturf activism or to not participate at all 
 256. El Tom, supra note 21; see also id. (“Many would question whether association with the 
arms and tobacco industries is compatible with the promotion of ideals of justice and 
social progress. Even if no position of principle is taken, however, NGOs certainly 
need to explain how association with these industries is consistent with their 
objectives.”). 
 257. El Tom, White Savior, supra note 249. 
 258. See, e.g., Tom Levitt, Conservation International “Agreed to Greenwash Arms Company,” 
ECOLOGIST (May 11, 2011), http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/877241/
conservation_international_agreed_to_greenwash_arms_company.html.  
 259. See Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, supra note 161.  
 260. See Molina-Gallart, supra note 245, at 43-44. 
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sacrifices benefits the private sector may otherwise offer to the lawmaking 
process (an access problem). 
1. Opacity 
Astroturf activism, as defined in these pages, is the phenomenon whereby 
an organization like CARE can advance the agenda of Cargill before 
international organizations, including at U.N.-sponsored treaty conferences.261 
As the preceding paragraphs have demonstrated, the distorted nature of this 
phenomenon is most starkly apparent when business organizations capture 
purportedly independent associations, such as the CIAR, or form their own 
associations, such as the National Wetlands Coalition.262 In both cases, the 
association’s nonprofit status, benign mission statement, and often public-
regarding title obscure the sponsoring company’s profit-seeking motives.  
Astroturf activism also describes the related scenario in which powerful 
businesses capture trade associations that purport to speak on behalf of a wider 
range of actors in a particular industry but in fact are captured by a single actor 
or a set of powerful actors. This happened, for example, in the context of the 
Tobacco Convention, when the tobacco industry co-opted the ITGA.263 While 
the trade association “claims to represent the interests of local farmers,” as the 
Tobacco Report noted, in fact the organization was “funded” and “directed” by 
major multinational tobacco companies such as Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, 
and the British American Tobacco Company.264  
Finally, the astroturf activism phenomenon also captures the scenario in 
which for-profit entities escape the notice of gatekeepers and become accredited, 
notwithstanding the noncompliance of these associations with accreditation 
eligibility rules.265 It is challenging for a gatekeeper or onlooker to police 
whether an association is a nonprofit or for-profit entity because international 
gatekeepers rely on the representations of the association itself and a company 
obtains nonprofit or for-profit status at the domestic level by registering with 
a national or local government.266 
 261. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 262. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 263. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 7 (“[T]obacco companies 
made prominent use of the International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA) . . . 
[which] claims to represent the interests of local farmers. The documents indicate, 
however, that tobacco companies have funded the organization and directed its 
work.”). 
 264. Id.; see also id. at 2 (identifying the relevant tobacco companies). 
 265. This latter phenomenon was described in Part II.B.2 above. 
 266. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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In short, the current system allows—and perhaps even encourages—the 
funneling of business views into NGOs or their aggregation into trade 
associations. In such a regime, it is very difficult for international lawmakers, 
officials, and academic or public critics to determine which entity is trying to 
advance which goals. 
2. Mission accountability  
Indeed, the interest-mapping problem is a subspecies of a larger problem 
that Dana Brakman Reiser and Claire R. Kelly call a “mission accountability” 
problem, which can bedevil any regime that accepts organizations as 
consultants or lawmakers.267 Mission accountability, in the Reiser and Kelly 
formulation, “means that the organization owes fealty to achieving its 
particular goals or purpose, i.e., its mission.”268 In the consultancy arena, an 
accredited organization must have “aims and purposes” that align with the 
goals of the United Nations as a whole or the particular agency or organ to 
which the organization is accredited as a consultant.269 This “aims and 
purposes” requirement—which is replicated both in Article 71 of the U.N. 
Charter and in the Council’s implementing regulations—clearly puts an onus 
on gatekeepers to determine the mission and purpose of a given organization 
when those gatekeepers admit the organization to the consultancy ranks.270  
Setting aside the gatekeeping problem for a moment, consider the experi-
ence of a lawmaker who is weighing the contributions of a number of 
accredited organizations that have offered opinions with respect to a 
lawmaking project. An international lawmaker must be able to identify and 
rely on the authenticity of the mission the organization pursues in order for 
the lawmaker to effectively assess that input.271 This is true whether the 
lawmaker seeks the input of organizations for the purpose of gaining valuable 
expertise from those organizations or, instead, for enhancing the legitimacy of 
 267. Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy 
of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011, 1047 (2011) (“For an NGO involvement 
to enhance the legitimacy of global governance, its mission must align with the global 
governance goals of an international regulator or the international community.”). 
 268. Id. at 1022. 
 269. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 270. Moreover, to effectively implement this Article 71 legal requirement, it would be 
necessary to institute some sort of ongoing monitoring or screening function to 
respond to the mission accountability issue Reiser and Kelly have identified. Organiza-
tions with Council accreditation are required to submit regular reports. See E.S.C. Res. 
1996/31, supra note 84, ¶¶ 55, 61 (requiring accredited consultants to submit quadrenni-
al reports). But some query whether this reporting system is effective at policing 
mission accountability. Cf. Reiser & Kelly, supra note 267, at 1050 (noting that global 
regulators need to address the regulatory gap). 
 271. See Reiser & Kelly, supra note 267, at 1049. 
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the decisional process by weighing a variety of viewpoints prior to making a 
decision.272 Organizations cannot contribute to the “input” legitimacy of a 
lawmaking process—that is, the integrity of a process of decisionmaking—
unless it is possible for lawmakers to be assured of the mission accountability 
of the organizations that participate.273  
Moreover, in addition to lawmakers, critics and onlookers are also ill 
equipped to assess the input legitimacy of an international lawmaking process 
unless they, too, are able to assess the mission accountability of the participant 
organizations. In other words, beyond lawmakers and gatekeepers, mission 
accountability is also a problem for observers who are trying to assess the 
legitimacy of the process of decisionmaking by determining which interests 
were accommodated in that lawmaking process.  
Reiser and Kelly note that, for a number of reasons, mission accountability 
is “difficult to track and enforce.”274 The descriptive analysis offered in this 
Article adds a further layer of complication to this problem. In particular, the 
astroturf activism phenomenon adds the potential for mixed, indeterminate, 
and profit-driven motives, and it reduces the capacity of international 
lawmakers and onlookers to evaluate mission accountability. 
In addition to mission accountability problems, Reiser and Kelly identify 
financial accountability as another potential problem to guard against. In 
defining financial accountability, Reiser and Kelly focus on the tendency of 
organizations to use funds inappropriately to benefit insiders, “skimming off 
funds” and leaving the organization with fewer resources to pursue its 
 272. See id. 
 273. Input legitimacy refers to “participation in, and the process of, decision making.” Id. at 
1016. See generally Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global 
Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 406-07 (2006) (identifying input and 
output legitimacy criteria); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1493-94 (2006) (arguing that 
administrative law principles like opportunity to comment and power sharing affect 
the legitimacy of international processes).  
 274. Reiser & Kelly, supra note 267, at 1029. It is, first, difficult to find “how and where a 
nonprofit’s mission is articulated.” Id. Then, even if one does find an organization’s 
mission statement, that statement “may be quite general, such as an organization 
formed for ‘religious’ or ‘educational’ purposes.” Id. at 1029-30. Missions can evolve over 
time. See id. at 1030. Moreover, there are few domestic or international mechanisms to 
police whether an organization holds to any particular mission. See id. at 1030-31 
(noting that under U.S. domestic law, the key officials charged with policing nonprofit 
mission accountability are state attorneys general and the IRS but the “tools with 
which these regulators are equipped are ill-suited to enforcing mission accountability”). 
In fact, although Reiser and Kelly note that “mission accountability is fundamental to 
an NGO’s legitimacy as an entity, . . . [m]onitoring mission at every turn” would be 
impractical and counterproductive because it would “require regulators to devote vast 
resources and would diminish NGOs’ ability to innovate in a sphere separate from 
government influence.” Id. at 1035-36. 
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mission.275 While astroturf activism is not a financial accountability problem 
per se, it is a mission accountability problem that is affected by an organiza-
tion’s financial pressures and incentives. When an organization accepts large 
donations, it faces pressure to accommodate the preferences of those donors. 
That organization becomes more susceptible to capture. The result of 
inappropriate use of funds and inappropriate acceptance of funds can merge. As 
Reiser and Kelly put it, without financial accountability, “NGOs risk becoming 
ineffective or even sham organizations, which are inadequate to regulate or 
contribute to the work of other global regulators.”276 
3. Gatekeeping  
The opacity and mission accountability issues caused or exacerbated by 
astroturf activism place added burdens on an already taxed gatekeeping system. 
Gatekeeping is the province of the NGO Committee,277 which meets only 
twice per year to vote on pending applications, most of which it eventually 
approves.278 But the NGO Committee’s work is plagued by political 
obstruction,279 a ballooning workload as an increasing number of organiza-
tions seek accreditation,280 and limited capacity to investigate the veracity of 
the information presented for its review.281 These limitations make it difficult 
for the committee to effectively assess whether an aspiring consultant fronts 
for a for-profit entity.282 The astroturf activism phenomenon thus both 
exposes the limitations of the gatekeeping that exists and potentially serves as 
one of the many factors that overwhelm it. 
 275. Id. at 1044-45. 
 276. Id. at 1047. 
 277. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
 278. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. The presumption toward accreditation is so 
strong that denied applications were usually deferred rather than closed. See Econ. & 
Soc. Council, Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Governmental Orgs. on Its 2014 Resumed 
Session ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/2014/32 (Part II) (June 12, 2014). 
 279. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 359 (“The work of the committee in granting and 
reviewing accreditation of NGOs has been criticized for overpoliticization and lack of 
due process.” (citing Cardoso Report, supra note 29, at 54)). 
 280. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
 281. Hartwick, supra note 100, at 224 n.45 (noting that an aspiring consultant’s compliance 
with the accreditation criteria is assessed by a review of the organization’s application 
materials and that “the UN does not actually verify” the information contained in these 
documents). 
 282. Domestic mechanisms do not currently perform this task effectively. Reiser & Kelly, 
supra note 267, at 1050 (“[E]nforcement of domestic nonprofit law will not sufficiently 
guard NGOs’ mission accountability.”).  
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4. Access  
An additional kind of potential harm emerges from the current accredita-
tion rules because they exclude direct business input into the accreditation 
process. The legal rules that structure the consultancy regime offer an 
incentive and, in fact, an imperative for major corporate actors to speak 
through nonprofits; otherwise, corporate perspectives go unheard. 
While commentators sometimes note that for-profit entities can thwart 
public agendas,283 business input can also have positive effects on the 
international process. Involving business in international lawmaking can 
sometimes produce better rules, reduce business resistance to the rules 
ultimately adopted, and facilitate a more effective international lawmaking 
process.284 Thus, the current consultancy rules cause harm in part because they 
exclude major international corporations from having direct access to the 
international lawmaking process. Corporate actors that seek to contribute 
their expertise and perspectives are forced to make use of the accreditation 
regime designed for nonprofit members of civil society. There is no parallel 
access mechanism for corporate actors that seek to act directly. Corporate 
actors are required to: engage in astroturf activism, find alternative channels to 
reach international lawmakers, or forgo any form of input. Because companies 
are forced into covert activity rather than having the chance to act directly, 
international lawmakers miss out on valuable benefits these corporate actors 
might have to offer through direct engagement. 
 Of course, not all will agree that the lack of a direct channel of access for 
business entities is a bug rather than a feature of the current system. Here are a 
few potential counterarguments:  
First, direct access for business entities might give businesses too much 
access to officials and lawmakers, drowning out other voices, decreasing the 
legitimacy of a lawmaking process, or increasing nefarious and destructive 
influences. This may be a particular concern because businesses may play a 
two-level game, lobbying both domestic and international officials. Moreover, 
businesses may continue to use front groups even if they enjoy the benefits of 
direct access, unduly duplicating their impact.  
 283. This is, of course, one of the concerns animating the debate over the Citizens United 
decision. See sources cited supra notes 4-5. 
 284. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public 
International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 787-88 (arguing for an expanded role for 
transnational corporations in international lawmaking on the theory that these 
corporations would be more likely to accept international law rules if they regarded 
these rules as legitimate and that legitimacy would be enhanced by corporate access to 
the rulemaking process); Durkee, supra note 6, at 295-96 (noting that business 
participation in the process of treatymaking can contribute technical expertise and 
break political logjams, facilitating negotiations between differently situated states). 
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Second, even if direct business access does not cause the harms just men-
tioned, it may increase at least the appearance of corruption and illegitimacy, 
which international officials and lawmakers may seek to avoid.  
Finally, forcing businesses to speak through NGOs may serve a tempering 
function. Requiring businesses to engage in conversations with nonprofits 
could prove to be useful in restraining and enhancing the socially useful aspects 
of the business contribution to the lawmaking process. Clearly, more data are 
needed to determine whether this potential counterargument has a basis in 
fact; it offers a productive avenue for future research.  
Putting aside the final point, the first two concerns might be ameliorated 
by legal reforms that sufficiently identify and respond to the astroturf activism 
phenomenon. The next Part begins with three different kinds of analysis, 
addressing the genesis, persistence, and coherence of the current legal 
structure, and then concludes with some preliminary proposals as to how such 
reforms might be structured.  
III. Accounting for Astroturfing 
The early twenty-first century reflects a new epoch of engagement 
between three sets of actors: states, business entities, and civil society.285 The 
international system both evinces the new patterns of engagement and 
struggles to adapt its legal structures to the challenges these new relationships 
present.286 While this struggle may be seen throughout the international 
system, this Article explores a particular example of it: the U.N. consultancy 
system, which reveals an area where legal rules fail to accommodate the 
changing nature of relationships between the state, businesses, and civil 
society. This Article argues that the new facts require new legal tools to 
effectively regulate the respective contributions of each of these actors to 
international lawmaking. 
This Part constructs an analysis of the U.N. consultancy rules that facilitate 
astroturf activism. The analysis is tripartite. It begins with a historical account 
 285. Other commentators have noted the blurring of lines between state actors on the one 
hand and nonstate actors such as businesses and NGOs on the other. See, e.g., Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000) (noting 
the “deep interdependence among public and private actors in accomplishing the 
business of governance”). This Article instead focuses on the blurring of lines between 
two different kinds of nonstate actors: businesses and NGOs. Nevertheless, identifying 
the three as distinct categories of actors serves as a useful means of shorthand and one 
that is customary in the literature. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50, at 513 
(describing transnational regulation as the product of a “[g]overnance [t]riangle” 
between states, firms, and NGOs (bolding omitted)). 
 286. This Article uses the term “international system” to refer to the organizations, courts, 
networks, and other institutions that organize and regulate global society. 
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of the rise of business entities as global actors, demonstrating that the social 
facts on which the consultancy structure is founded have changed, rendering 
the current rules outdated and unsuited to the phenomena they regulate. This 
historical account explains the existence of rules that respond poorly to the 
astroturf activism phenomenon. Next, a functional account identifies 
efficiency reasons for the persistence of that legal structure. This Part then 
asserts that the current structure exhibits conceptual incoherence between a 
principle of pluralistic equality on the one hand and an instrumentalist 
approach to admitting consultants on the other. 
Finally, this Part builds on the three-part analysis of the consultancy 
regime to identify potential avenues for reform. One potential reform strategy 
would open a regulatory pathway to include individual businesses, providing 
them more direct access to state-driven lawmaking processes and offering 
states and international lawmakers more opportunities for regulatory control 
of that business access. An alternate reform strategy would require enhanced 
disclosures, relying on interested third parties to identify the more pernicious 
forms of astroturf activism and arming those third parties to do so more 
effectively. Either approach may offer benefits for international legal 
structures beyond the Council’s consultancy regime, serving as a blueprint for 
wider legal reform.  
A. History: Epochs of Engagement 
Astroturf activism can be explained by the historical development of the 
relationship between states and business entities, as well as the development of 
the relationship between each of those two entities and civil society. As Part I 
described, the U.N. consultancy regime codified, and thus froze in time, the 
League of Nations-era consultancy practice.287 Although the legal rules 
structuring the consultancy regime were updated in 1996, that update did not 
change the Council’s basic approach to business entities, which remains the 
same in its essential details as it was in the early twentieth century. Yet in the 
intervening century, the nature of multinational enterprises—specifically their 
global power and their relationships with states—has undergone profound and 
fundamental changes. The argument of this Part, then, is that the flaws in the 
law are rooted in obsolescence. Thus, while Part I.B offered a historical account 
of the Council’s exclusion of business entities from the consultancy system, this 
Part constructs the obsolescence argument by mapping that history onto a 
separate account of the development of business entities during this time.  
 287. See supra Part I.C. 
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1. Epoch One: League of Nations 
In the early twentieth century, when the League of Nations practice 
developed, it was practical for businesses to communicate with international 
organizations solely through trade or industry associations in part because few 
businesses would have had the capacity to participate in international 
lawmaking on their own behalves. While some colonial trading companies 
functioned as transnational entities as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the number of entities operating across national borders remained 
small until the time of the Industrial Revolution.288 It was during that period—
between 1850 and 1914—that more businesses began to emerge as transnational 
entities.289 Even so, the late nineteenth century was a period of only limited 
transnational business development. The growth was limited initially to 
British firms,290 followed around the turn of the twentieth century by 
emerging U.S. firms.291 And, even then, the growth was limited in scope and 
focused on former colonizers and their former colonies.292  
Thus, the early twentieth-century League of Nations practice emerged in a 
period in which few businesses operated across national borders, had the 
capacity to lobby international decisionmakers, and had the motivation to do 
so. On the other hand, associations of businesses, like the ICC, were active at 
this time alongside other voluntary organizations like the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom.293 Because economic develop-
ment organizations were among those animating the League of Nations at this 
time, it would have been perfectly natural that economically motivated 
voluntary associations would have had status equal to that of other kinds of 
voluntary associations.  
2. Epoch Two: U.N. Charter 
In 1945, at the time of the drafting of the U.N. Charter, the international 
community was just emerging from the second period in the development of 
 288. PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 8-9 (2d ed. 2007) 
(noting that although the “great European colonial trading companies” were commis-
sioned in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Industrial Revolution ushered in 
technologies that enabled many more entities to function across borders, so most 
economists date the emergence of multinational business entities to this period).  
 289. Id. at 10 (explaining that, in this period, multinational business entities “began to 
emerge as part of the newly developing modern industrial economy”). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 10-11. 
 292. See id. at 12 (noting that, in this time, cross-national investment was focused on African 
and Asian colonies and the newly independent Latin American nations). 
 293. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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modern multinational entities.294 That period, stretching from 1918 to 1939, 
featured a much slower rate of development due to instability in the world 
economy, significantly more nationalistic economic policies, and national 
cartels in various industry sectors.295 Thus, because business-promoting 
nonprofit associations had been operating alongside other kinds of voluntary 
associations since the early twentieth century in the international system—and 
business entities had not acquired substantially greater power, influence, or 
transnational capacity in the intervening time—the U.N. drafters (and later the 
Council) did not erect a new distinction between profit-focused consultants 
and everyone else. In fact, these actors were not focused on the issue of business 
entities, either individually or in associations.296 There was simply not yet 
reason to change the first epoch’s accreditation structure. 
3. Epoch Three: 1990s-era reforms 
Next was an era of massive growth of business entities and the transfor-
mation of many of these businesses into fully transnational and multinational 
actors. This third epoch of multinational business development followed 
World War II, stretching from 1945 to 1990.297 In that period, multinational 
enterprises “acquired unprecedented importance in international produc-
tion.”298 First, American firms grew rapidly in the first decade and a half after 
World War II and were globally dominant until the 1970s.299 Then came a 
period, starting in the 1960s, of international competition, as European and 
Japanese firms emerged from the shocks of World War II and were joined by 
newly industrialized economies—China and the formerly socialist countries in 
Eastern Europe.300 The rapid growth in multinational corporations in the 
third epoch brought a literature suspicious of that growth and increasing 
global power.301 Also in this time social scientists began to draw distinctions 
 294. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 288, at 12. 
 295. Id. 
 296. As noted in Part I.B above, by 1945, when the United Nations enshrined the League of 
Nations practice in Article 71, the drafters were instead preoccupied with the 
distinction between national and international voluntary associations. See also E.S.C. 
Res. 1296 (XLIV), supra note 84, ¶ 7 (defining an NGO as “[a]ny international organiza-
tion which is not established by intergovernmental agreement”). 
 297. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 288, at 15. 
 298. Id.  
 299. See id. at 15-18. 
 300. See id. at 18-21. 
 301. See, e.g., RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. 
ENTERPRISES (1971) (providing an account of the future wherein multinational power 
would grow at the expense of state power); see also John Gerard Ruggie, Business and 
Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 819 (2007) 
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between economic actors on the one hand and the remainder of nonstate actors 
on the other, with the latter coming to be known as “civil society.”302  
While it would seem that this change in the nature of business entities 
might militate toward a change in the consultancy access rules, that change did 
not occur because, again, the Council was focused on a different issue: 
heightened awareness of disparities between the developing world and 
industrialized states.303 The new accreditation rules therefore affected the 
types of organizations to be accredited only on the margins and did not 
produce a wholesale change. Specifically, the rules did not reframe the role of 
businesses as consultants in light of the Epoch Three growth in those entities. 
4. Epoch Four: globalization of influence 
Finally, the decades since 1990 have been characterized by rampant 
globalization. As one commentator expressed, business entities have now 
grown so much that “[t]hey appear to be a power unto themselves.”304 Many 
businesses have acquired size and economic capacity that rivals that of states.305 
Many more of them have become transnational entities, with supply chains 
crossing national borders and transnational or global distribution of goods and 
services.306 Many of them have become actively involved in self-regulation and 
(noting that the United Nations “attempted to establish binding international rules to 
govern the activities of transnationals in the 1970s”). 
 302. See generally JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 
(1992) (elaborating a three-part model that distinguishes civil society, economic society, 
and political society). Cohen and Arato noted in 1992 that “[t]he concept of civil society 
. . . has become quite fashionable today, thanks to struggles against communist and 
military dictatorships in many parts of the world.” Id. at vii. 
 303. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. Thus, the 1996 rules change focused on 
enhancing the diversity of associations and interests represented among the consult-
ants, particularly with respect to amplifying voices in the developing world. See supra 
notes 91-92 and accompanying text. It was also responsive to a literature that 
challenged the legitimacy of participation by these associations and thus focused on 
demanding internal governance structures that made associations accountable to their 
members. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
 304. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 288, at 3; see also id. (“It is often said that the major 
[multinational enterprises] have a turnover larger than many nation states, that they 
are powerful enough to set their own rules and to sidestep national regulation.”).  
 305. See Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 527, 541 n.39 (2001) (noting that some global corporations have 
“annual operating budgets vastly in excess of most states”). 
 306. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 288, at 21-22 (arguing that this period brought “adoption of 
truly global production chains by [multinational enterprises] and their associates, a 
marked shift from raw materials and manufacturing towards services based [foreign 
direct investment], and the development of major regional trade and investment 
liberalization regimes, alongside the establishment of the WTO”). 
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co-regulation with states.307 Their capacities to lobby spread from principally 
national activity to include significant foreign, transnational, and international 
lobbying as well.308 Their partnership and consent became indispensable to 
many projects at the heart of the international agenda, such as development, 
trade, and climate change.309 Innovations such as benefit corporations (which 
seek “triple bottom line” economic, environmental, and social returns) and 
social finance (which “operates at the intersection of commerce and 
philanthropy”) have blurred lines between business actors and civil society 
actors.310 Indeed, as Sarah Dadush notes, “[i]n a world of diminishing public 
funding for addressing social problems, governments and international 
organizations are evermore eager to put private investment to work in the 
social sphere.”311 But this fourth epoch of mixed interests, where corporations 
and impact investors pursue public goods together with private profit, comes 
with risks.312 The risks include the potential for conflicts of interest and 
mission drift that can ultimately undermine these public goods and cause 
serious harm.313  
As this historical account makes clear, one way to understand the charac-
teristics of the current accreditation regime is to view it as a historical relic 
born of early twentieth-century League of Nations relationships that has 
persisted long past its shelf life. That is, the consultancy rules have persisted 
into a time when the entities in that relationship have so fundamentally altered 
 307. See, e.g., HAUFLER, supra note 50, at 3-4 (offering case studies that explore the 
phenomenon of industry self-regulation in codes of conduct and coordinated 
standards); Danielsen, supra note 50, at 412 (identifying private businesses’ varying 
roles in global governance); Freeman, supra note 285, at 547 (identifying business 
participation in shaping the content of regulatory rules in the United States in what 
the author describes as a process of contractual co-creation, rather than traditional top-
down, command-and-control regulation); Scherer & Palazzo, supra note 50, at 911 
(“Business firms engage in processes of self-regulation through ‘soft law’ in instances 
where state agencies are unable or unwilling to regulate.”). 
 308. See Ruggie, supra note 301, at 819 (referring to the “expanding reach and growing 
influence of transnational corporations”). 
 309. See José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 1, 5 (2011) (“[C]orporations . . . have exerted considerable influence in the 
making of rules governing trade, investment, antitrust, intellectual property, and 
telecommunications . . . .”).  
 310. Sarah Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock Exchanges Meet the Challenge?, 37 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 139, 143, 159-60 (2015). 
 311. Id. at 143; see also id. at 143-44 (“We’ve got a great idea here that can really transform 
our societies by using the power of finance to tackle the most difficult social problems 
that we face.” (quoting David Cameron, U.K. Prime Minister, Speech at the Social 
Impact Investment Forum (June 6, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
speeches/prime-ministers-speech-at-the-social-impact-investment-conference)).  
 312. See id. at 144-45. 
 313. See id. 
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that the categories the rules were built on no longer retain their form. It is only 
over time that the great mass of organizations now known as “civil society” 
began to be understood as distinct from profit-motivated business organiza-
tions.314 Now, trade and industry associations are treated as “civil society” even 
though businesses are otherwise distinguished. At the same time, those profit-
motivated businesses now have a greater capacity to participate in internation-
al processes on their own, rather than through associations. They have 
elsewhere begun to take much more substantial roles as transnational power 
brokers, standard setters, and participants in international governance. 
The historical critique suggests that the astroturf activism phenomenon 
stems from a significantly evolved relationship between business entities and 
states (and, in turn, international organizations) and legal rules that do not 
accommodate these new social facts. In other words, the positive historical 
account gives rise to the normative critique that while the regime may have 
been appropriate in the early twentieth-century social context, it no longer 
serves well in the context of a very different set of social facts. This account 
shows which solutions lie behind—the unitary approach of Epochs One and 
Two and the 1990s-era sharp divisions between economic actors and the 
remainder of civil society—and which lie ahead—an approach that recognizes 
the reality that businesses are, in fact, powerful global actors deeply involved 
in global governance. Thus, the historical account appears to point toward a 
legal structure that accommodates business actors but better reveals economic 
and profit-seeking agendas to ameliorate the harms of opacity, mission 
accountability, and gatekeeper incapacity identified in Part II.C above.  
B. Function: An Efficiency Analysis 
While the historical account casts the consultancy regime as a product of 
the particular social context in which it developed, this Subpart introduces a 
second positive account of the consultancy regime. That is, there is a second 
way to answer the question, “Why does the consultancy regime persist in its 
current form?” The answer takes the form of an efficiency account.  
The efficiency explanation arises from the observation that avoiding the 
astroturf activism phenomenon at the accreditation or NGO annual reporting 
stages would be costlier than the structure that currently exists, which sends 
on downstream the burden to ferret out astroturf activism. Those downstream 
actors are the international organization officials and lawmakers who 
ultimately receive the consultants’ input. Thus, the existing accreditation 
 314. See generally COHEN & ARATO, supra note 302 (tracing the history of the term “civil 
society” and distinguishing civil society from business actors); JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL 
SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1999) (examining the historical, political, 
and theoretical development of the concept of civil society). 
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structure relieves the burden on the NGO Committee to assess the bona fides of 
would-be consultants by placing the admission threshold very low. Instead, it 
shifts that burden to the lawmakers who are later at the receiving end of that 
consultant lobbying. In the current structure, those lawmakers, many of whom 
are accepting NGO input to try to preside over a legitimate process, are the 
ones who must decide whether the actors presenting position statements and 
other comments are public-regarding NGOs, corporate mouthpieces, or 
something in between. That work has not been done for them upstream, at the 
accreditation stage. 
Why leave it to the downstream officials and lawmakers to assess the 
authenticity of NGO positions, rather than placing this burden on the 
upstream accreditation gatekeepers? The efficiency argument is that the 
Council gatekeepers are the actors best positioned to effect a change in the 
accreditation rules, so the rule that persists will be the rule most helpful to 
those gatekeepers. And, in fact, an overly inclusive accreditation standard 
conserves limited gatekeeper resources, so that is the rule that persists.  
Gatekeeper resources are limited for a number of reasons. In fact, over six 
hundred organizations applied for consultative status in the 2014-2015 one-year 
period.315 And tracing lines of accountability for NGOs is notoriously 
difficult.316 Moreover, it is difficult to determine the functional mission of an 
organization and ensure that the organization maintains a stable mission over 
time.317 The Council has implemented some safeguards, such as requiring 
organizations to report income streams and governance structures.318 But even 
with these reporting requirements, there is no simple or consistently effective 
way to ferret out business influence in NGOs, as the astroturf activism 
phenomenon exemplifies.319 Nor is there a simple or consistently effective way 
 315. See Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2015 Regular 
Session, U.N. Doc. E/2015/32 (2015); Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Governmental 
Organizations on Its 2015 Resumed Session, U.N. Doc. E/2015/32 (2015). 
 316. There is a robust literature on this point. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 843 
(evaluating NGOs’ “external” accountability as supposed representatives of the 
“peoples” of the world and noting the “open and contested” nature of questions in this 
area); Blitt, supra note 61, at 367-68 (noting that controls have not been put into place to 
ensure NGO accountability); Reiser & Kelly, supra note 267, at 1011 (suggesting that 
domestic nonprofit law offers some measures to resolve the accountability deficits); 
Weiss, supra note 25, at 358 (noting that it can be difficult for donors and others to hold 
NGOs accountable); see also Charnovitz, supra note 62, at 893 & n.15 (collecting 
literature on accountability). 
 317. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.  
 318. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 319. For instance, consider an NGO that advances clean energy goals but reports corporate 
membership and funding. How will this organization balance its clean energy goals 
with the interests of its corporate shareholders, and how will gatekeepers ascertain this 
footnote continued on next page 
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to determine whether an organization that has ties to profit-seeking companies 
will promote public-regarding rules or rather advance rules that serve the 
economic bottom line while ultimately proving detrimental to other U.N. aims 
and purposes.320 All of these factors place an enormous burden on the actors 
that must assess which organizations to admit to the consultancy regime and 
which to exclude. A functionalist reading of this structure suggests that the 
broadly inclusive standards exist because they do not waste gatekeeper 
resources by entangling the Council or its NGO Committee in an attempt to 
make decisions these entities simply lack the capacity to make effectively.321 
The efficiency account leads to a normative prescription that would focus 
reform efforts on the bounded capacity of NGO Committee gatekeepers and 
the Council’s reporting monitors. One approach would be to address not the 
initial gatekeepers and monitors but rather those downstream lawmakers who 
will later receive input from the accredited consultants and weigh the value of 
the ideas those consultants propose. Those downstream lawmakers could be 
assisted, for instance, by disclosure requirements that are better tailored to 
assessing the astroturf activism phenomenon, which the current rules do not 
address.322 They might also be assisted if more of those disclosures by 
consultants (in initial applications or ongoing reports) were publicly available 
in a searchable database. Making disclosures publicly available would make 
these disclosures available to the lawmakers themselves, and they would also 
equip third parties to more effectively assist those lawmakers. Third parties 
could then help police the bona fides of accredited organizations. For example, 
other consulting NGOs would then be better equipped to respond to 
contributions they see as harmful and inconsistent with an organization’s 
stated mission and elevate those concerns to lawmakers.323  
balance? The current consultation regime offers no mechanism to address this kind of 
potential mission accountability issue. 
 320. Cf. Dadush, supra note 310, at 144-47 (noting potential harms that flow from mission 
drift).  
 321. There may also be a political economy story at play here, which would flow from the 
presumption that government agencies wish to preserve and consolidate their power 
and authority. Permissive accreditation criteria permit more discretion by the Council 
and its NGO Committee gatekeepers and thus allow the Council to have more control 
over which associations will be admitted as consultants than a more highly developed 
set of rules would. 
 322. For further discussion, see Part III.D.2 below. 
 323. Enhanced disclosure could be facilitated by, for example, opening a separate regulatory 
pathway for business entities and business-supporting associations. See infra Part III.D.2. 
The proposal is preliminary, however, and merits more sustained analysis. 
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C. Normative Theory: Pluralistic Equality 
While the previous Subparts offered historical and functional critiques of 
the consultancy rules, this Subpart moves on to the third form of analysis, 
which is a normative evaluation of the jurisprudential coherence of the 
consultancy structure. This form of critique deserves a sustained analysis that 
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a preliminary examination 
suggests that the consultancy regime is conceptually incoherent: while it 
exhibits characteristics of both pluralism and an instrumentalist “mediating 
institutions”324 theory, it does not consistently follow either principle.  
The term “pluralism” has a variety of definitions and usages,325 but it is 
often used to describe and analyze the relationships between state and nonstate 
actors.326 In one formulation, relevant to our topic, the basic thesis of pluralism 
is that “the State is but one of a number of associations within society.”327 In 
fact, states—and, in turn, international organizations constituted by states—are 
not “the sole originator[s] and interpreter[s] of law.”328 Rather, in the pluralist 
vision, “all associations in society, from . . . [national] government[s] down to 
the smallest and most marginalized group, are formally equal and are entitled 
to dignity and consideration—to sovereignty in their own affairs.”329 By 
extension, international organizations constituted by states are on the same 
footing as states and other associational groups.330  
 324. Snyder, supra note 80, at 366. 
 325. See, e.g., PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW 
BEYOND BORDERS 12 n.25 (2012) (collecting literature on pluralism); Erez Aloni, The 
Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 318-19 (2016) (discussing 
definitions of pluralism); Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1421-29 (2012) (discussing various justifications for pluralism in 
private law). 
 326. Meghan Campbell & Geoffrey Swenson, Legal Pluralism and Women’s Rights After 
Conflict: The Role of CEDAW, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2805359 (“Definitions [of pluralism] are 
almost always rooted in idealized notions of how the state and non-state justice systems 
should operate.”). But see BERMAN, supra note 325, at 14 (“[H]ard-line pluralists will 
complain that a view focusing on how official actors respond to hybridity is overly 
state-centric.”). 
 327. Snyder, supra note 80, at 389; see also BERMAN, supra note 325, at 12-13 (“[L]egal 
pluralists have long noted that law does not reside solely in the coercive commands of a 
sovereign power. Rather, law is constantly constructed through the contest of . . . 
various norm-generating communities.” (footnote omitted)). 
 328. Snyder, supra note 80, at 389; see also BERMAN, supra note 325, at 12 (“Pluralism . . . 
recognizes that our conception of law must include more than just officially sanctioned 
governmental edicts or formal court documents. . . . [M]any different non-state 
communities assert various forms of jurisdiction and impose all kinds of normative 
demands.”). 
 329. Snyder, supra note 80, at 389. 
 330. See id. 
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Because the pluralist thesis puts the state on the same ground as all other 
associations, the theory holds that it is not the state’s role to choose between 
organizations and elevate some over others.331 Rather, in the pluralist 
conception, “[e]ach of these groups is organized for a purpose, and each is an 
end in itself, not merely a piece of the ‘State’s machinery.’”332 Pluralistic 
principles thus justify a regulatory structure that facilitates the flourishing of a 
diversity of groups and associations alongside the state. 
Nevertheless, pluralistic principles do not require nonintervention. 
Because there will, of course, be conflicts between different associational 
groups, any society will develop “mechanisms to mediate the conflicts” 
between these groups.333 In fact, according to one common interpretation of 
pluralistic principles, pluralism requires the state to regulate and control the 
participation of various associations.334 A commitment to diversity and 
accommodation of different types of players means that the state can take 
separate steps to support the sovereignty and flourishing of each distinct 
category of players.335 
To apply these principles here, a consistently pluralist legal structure 
would support the participation of all types of associational groups, such as 
both profit-seeking and nonprofit organizations, although not necessarily 
without regulatory distinctions. The activity performed by nonprofits may 
very well be different from the activity performed by for-profits. And thus, 
according to pluralistic principles, while the state should accommodate both, it 
may also regulate them in a way that distinguishes between the two.336 
In contrast to the pluralistic thesis, in the “mediating institutions” view, 
nonstate associations serve instrumental purposes. In this account, voluntary 
 331. See id. 
 332. Id. (quoting Frederic William Maitland, Translator’s Introduction to OTTO GIERKE, 
POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE, at vii, xxi (Frederic William Maitland trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1900)). 
 333. Id. at 393. 
 334. See Dagan, supra note 325, at 1429-30 (arguing that pluralistic interpretation of private 
law is inconsistent with the noninterference approach to regulation); see also BERMAN, 
supra note 325, at 18 (noting that the cosmopolitan pluralist theory he advances “need 
not commit one to a worldview free from judgment, where all positions are equiva-
lently embraced” but instead argues for a set of “procedural mechanisms, institutions, 
and practices that are more likely to expand the range of voices heard or considered”); 
cf. Snyder, supra note 80, at 393 (arguing that the pluralistic thesis itself does not offer 
guidance as to how to mediate conflicts and order relationships among associations but 
rather just clarifies that the method we choose does not ultimately affect the status of 
those human associations as formally equal). 
 335. See Dagan, supra note 325, at 1425-29. 
 336. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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associations exist to mediate conflicts in state/nonstate relationships,337 for 
instance “to influence, channel, or mask the power of the State.”338 As Franklin 
Snyder argues, this “‘mediating’ institutions” conception is susceptible to 
unprincipled instrumentalism: 
If our goal is not the rampant flourishing of a rain forest of associations, but 
rather the careful care and pruning of valuable plants in a well-tended garden, we 
may . . . argue over which associations should be privileged . . . . [But] that means 
that the associations with the most political strength at the moment will likely be 
favored.339  
The literature on NGOs usually proceeds from an instrumental premise, 
Snyder asserts, and “asks what beneficial ends mediating institutions serve in 
their interactions with the State” in order to develop a theory of the legitimacy 
or value of these associations’ participation in the process.340 This, Snyder says, 
“work[s] backwards,” as commentators “see something that they find valuable,” 
observe “that these values are reflected or developed by certain associations,” 
and then “tend to develop theories that these groups (though not others) should 
be favored by (or at least protected from) the State.”341 A coherent legal 
structure organized on the principle that associations mediate between states 
and individuals must at least evidence consistent instrumentalism. In other 
words, a “mediating institutions” legal structure would exhibit principled 
consistency in the distinctions it makes between associations.  
Consider how the consultancy regime fits within the two theoretical 
structures offered here. The consultancy regime appears to be in large part 
pluralist in that it makes very few hierarchical distinctions or classifications 
among association type. Trade, religious, academic, and humanitarian 
associations are all grouped together in the same “rain forest of associations.”342 
But the legal framework does make the one key instrumentalist distinction 
 337. Snyder, supra note 80, at 366 (explaining that the “mediat[ion]” imagines “a bipolar 
world with the State at one end of the axis and the Individual at the other, with all the 
other associations in society distributed between them”). Associations are imagined to 
“mediat[e]” because they “occup[y] a middle position” and are “interposed between the 
extremes” of the state and the individual; they “interpose between parties in order to 
reconcile them or to interpret them to each other.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1402 (1981)). 
 338. Id. at 399. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 366. 
 341. Id. at 379. 
 342. Id. at 399; see also Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 362 (stating that “NGOs compete with 
other actors in a dynamic marketplace of ideas” and “nongovernmental ‘competition’ 
could lead to a richer WTO politics, which could help improve the effectiveness of the 
WTO” (quoting Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade 
Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 123, 135-37 
(1998))). 
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that is under scrutiny here: that between business associations and other kinds 
of associations. This distinction is odd in the pluralistic account as, in at least 
some formulations of that account, there is no principled way to distinguish 
between business entities and other types of voluntary associations. All are 
“aggregations of people and property working together to accomplish 
particular purposes.”343 This distinction in the consultancy rules implicitly 
reflects the value that only associations that pursue agendas other than the 
profit agenda provide acceptable inputs. Putting aside for a moment the 
legitimacy of that decision,344 the distinction itself exhibits an instrumental 
preference for some associational inputs over others. 
The consultancy legal structure thus seems to be incoherently theorized, 
with tendencies toward both pluralism and instrumentalism—or, that is, a 
“mediating institutions” account. A consistently pluralist legal structure would 
support diverse types of associational groups, even if it makes some regulatory 
distinctions between them. A structure that embraces instrumentalism must 
account for why it has chosen the particular viewpoints it seeks to embrace. 
The consultancy rules instead are inconsistent. They express an instrumental-
ist desire to admit associations that pursue the aims and purposes of the United 
Nations, exhibit good internal governance, and offer a balanced set of 
perspectives between the global north and south. Beyond that, they embrace 
pluralism, admitting all associations except business entities.345 The choice of 
business organizations as the only category of excluded associational group 
aside from states themselves suggests an inconsistent undertheorized 
instrumentalism.  
This normative, theory-based critique points toward reforms that would 
permit more direct access by business entities. These reforms would ease the 
 343. Snyder, supra note 80, at 378.  
 344. The distinction may express a fear of corruption by corporate influences—that 
admitting businesses directly through the consultancy regime will give them outsized 
influence in international negotiations. As the Tobacco Report makes clear, corporate 
influence can have detrimental impacts on international lawmaking processes. See 
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. The concern about undue corporate 
influence could be heightened by the fact that businesses are likely playing a two-level 
game—lobbying both at the national and international levels. On the other hand, the 
distinction seems to be out of step with the “triple bottom line” approaches of many 
modern business entities that seek social goods alongside profit, see Dadush, supra note 
310, at 148; the fact that businesses can also benefit the international lawmaking 
process, see Durkee, supra note 6; and the reality that many business entities are actively 
involved in developing regulation at the national and international levels, inde-
pendently or alongside states, see supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
 345. The de jure and de facto rules may diverge here, with the de facto rules significantly 
more political in nature. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the political nature of the 
gatekeeping process). 
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conceptual incoherence by eliminating undertheorized rules that serve 
unintended instrumentalist ends and move the needle toward pluralism. 
D. Legal Reform 
While a fully developed proposal is beyond the scope of this Article, the 
foregoing analysis does offer a set of guiding principles for future reforms. To 
be clear, the aim here is not to close the conversation but rather to open it: to 
identify productive avenues for systematic empirical research and point the 
way toward constructive analysis and reform. This Subpart first identifies the 
principles to arise from the foregoing analysis and then, drawing from those 
principles, offers two potential avenues for reform. 
1. Principles 
First, this research supports a strong hypothesis that covert business access 
is harmful. It is potentially harmful to officials and lawmakers receiving 
consultation because it obscures the identities of the true consultants, making it 
more difficult for them to weigh the merits of the input they receive.346 It also 
reduces the capacity of lawmakers to determine whether they have received 
input from a representative range of sources and thus achieved a process with 
input legitimacy.347 Covert business access is potentially harmful to NGOs 
because it diminishes the capacity of captured NGOs to hold to their missions 
and casts suspicion on all NGOs, whether captured or not, thus heightening 
concerns expressed throughout the literature about the legitimacy and 
accountability of their participation as consultants.348 It is potentially harmful 
to big businesses because it interposes an obstacle to communicating with 
lawmakers directly, which could filter the message and increase the cost. 
Finally, it may be harmful to small businesses, whose trade associations are co-
opted by major multinational players in search of a consultant association to 
pass along messages to lawmakers.349  
It is also possible that a lack of transparency is not always harmful—that 
there is a benefit to allowing businesses and NGOs to consult with each other 
prior to the time that those NGOs interpose their comments through the 
consultation procedure. This nontransparent initial consultation process 
could, hypothetically, improve downstream outcomes, tempering the NGO 
positions, business interests, or both. The outcome could be more pragmatic 
positions that are more acceptable to the relevant business interests than the 
 346. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 347. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 348. See sources cited supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. 
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NGO would have otherwise advanced; it could also result in more public-
regarding versions of those business perspectives than those businesses would 
advance on their own. Perhaps this initial discussion and crystallization of 
positions is more effective when accomplished out of the public eye. If so, some 
degree of nontransparency may be useful. The merits of this hypothesis could 
be tested further through research concerning the ways NGOs and nonprofit 
trade and industry associations develop positions internally prior to advancing 
them through the consultancy process. 
Second, the current consultancy rules, which force businesses to consult 
through nonprofits, fail to guard against (and may even provoke) capture, 
mission distortion, and covert behavior. The historical analysis of the previous 
Subpart shows that while requiring any business contribution to be made 
through nonprofits may have reasonably suited the respective capacities of 
early twentieth-century businesses, nonprofits, and international organiza-
tions, times have changed. Now, requiring businesses to speak through 
nonprofits can lead to the astroturf activism distortions identified in this 
Article. Many businesses are now fully capable of acting independently, and 
their interests are not always suitable for aggregation, even transparently 
through a trade association. As Stephen Tully points out, aggregating business 
interests in trade associations makes it “difficult to identify which business 
interlocutor reflects dominant corporate opinion . . . . Business and industry is 
incorrectly assumed to possess a coherent voice as determined by organization-
al attributes and operational specialization.”350  
Third, in some cases, direct business access to international officials and 
lawmakers (not mediated through nonprofit NGOs and industry associations) 
may be the better course of action. The reasons for this include the fact that, as 
the case studies presented above suggest, excluding them can lead to covert 
access and all the identified attendant harms.351 In other words, closing the 
door to business access points those entities to the proverbial window. It is also 
inefficient and impracticable to expect gatekeepers with limited capacities to 
extricate business influence that flows covertly through alternate channels, 
and offering direct access could reduce this flow.352 Moreover, as a matter of 
normative theory, excluding business would move away from the pluralistic 
approach to admitting associations that the U.N. access rules appear to 
affirm.353 This exclusion would require a coherent defense. Also, businesses can 
have valuable benefits to offer, including expertise, neutral resolutions to 
geopolitically sensitive problems, and an understanding of the practicality of 
 350. TULLY, supra note 106, at 220-21. 
 351. See supra Part II.B. 
 352. See supra Part III.B. 
 353. See supra Part III.C. 
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proposed rules.354 Finally, enlisting business input at the lawmaking stage can 
facilitate compliance down the line.355  
Of course, direct business access to officials and lawmakers could also have 
detrimental effects, including overrepresentation of business voices, an 
appearance of special treatment of businesses, and an appearance of corruption 
and reduced legitimacy of the lawmaking process. Direct input by businesses 
could also exacerbate inequities between representation from actors in the 
global north and south or overrepresent voices from a particular country or 
region—inequities that the Council has in the past tried to reduce. These 
countervailing concerns suggest that an effective legal reform must carve a 
careful middle ground to capture the benefits businesses can offer to the 
lawmaking process while restraining the harms. 
2. Implementation 
While the exact characteristics of a reformed approach to incorporating 
and restraining business input at the United Nations will require further study 
and analysis, I now suggest two potential approaches, together with some 
preliminary assessments about their benefits and shortcomings. 
Reform Approach A: Disclosure. One potential avenue for reform would rely 
solely on an increased disclosure regime. Such a disclosure regime could 
require, among other things, disclosure by NGOs and industry associations of 
any known affiliations of board members and more robust disclosure of any 
funding by corporate sources. A reform premised on disclosure would have to 
focus not just on what is disclosed but also on how best to enhance the 
effectiveness of the disclosures—including the disclosures already required as 
well as any additional disclosures. Because it is clear that the capacities of the 
NGO Committee gatekeepers are bounded,356 one way to enhance the 
effectiveness of any disclosures could be to make them more publicly available, 
perhaps on an easily searchable website accessible to the public. In this way, 
interested journalists, activists, NGOs, and other businesses could investigate 
potential mixed interests and bring them to the attention of gatekeepers and 
the officials and lawmakers at the receiving end of consultation. Another 
benefit of a disclosure regime is that it would not disturb mutually beneficial 
relationships between NGOs and business actors that can secure funding 
streams for NGOs and potentially temper and reform business contributions to 
the process.357  
 354. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 315-21 and accompanying text. 
 357. For a more extended discussion of this tempering point, see Part II.C.4 above.  
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Another benefit of an enhanced disclosure regime is that it could help 
officials and lawmakers better trace the origins and purposes of input they 
receive and ameliorate accountability and legitimacy problems. It would also 
help lawmakers ensure that they have secured input from a range of different 
viewpoints. 
Disclosure alone, however, has limits. For example, a reform that incorpo-
rated only enhanced disclosures would not address the concerns that 
aggregating corporate positions through industry associations reduces the 
clarity and effectiveness of corporate contributions that could otherwise assist 
the lawmaking process. It is also only effective when others have an incentive 
to monitor the disclosures and the capacity to effectively use the disclosures in 
a productive way. 
Reform Approach B: Accreditation Track for Business. Another potential 
approach to reform would involve allowing businesses direct access to officials 
and lawmakers, perhaps through a separate regulatory pathway for business 
consultants. This pathway could include individual business entities. It could 
also include the nonprofit associations that support profit-seeking entities, 
which previously have been lumped together with NGOs—such as industry 
and trade associations.358 Or the pathway could include just one or the other.  
A separate regulatory pathway offers the possibility for separate regula-
tions for profit-seeking entities on the one hand and NGOs in the traditional 
track on the other. This could include a separate application process, 
accreditation criteria, and admission procedures,359 all of which could be 
tailored to promote goals appropriate to members of the business community. 
For example, applicants could be required to commit to the United Nations 
Global Compact or make other commitments. Once accredited, businesses and 
business groups could have tailored access rights to lawmakers. That is, the 
rules could be structured to offer profit-seeking entities more or less access 
than NGOs in the traditional NGO track. For example, profit-seeking entities 
could have greater or fewer speaking minutes, agenda items, and written 
 358. Note that this proposed reform shares features with the consultancy structure 
established by the UNFCCC in that it proposes separate regulatory pathways for 
business entities and public interest NGOs. See UNFCCC, Non-Governmental 
Organization Constituencies 1-2, http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/
application/pdf/constituencies_and_you.pdf (outlining the UNFCCC constituency 
group accreditation process). However, it departs from the UNFCCC context in a 
significant respect: in the UNFCCC context business entities must always register 
through NGOs, and there is no consultancy pathway that they can access directly as 
profit-seeking entities. See id.  
 359. Cf. TULLY, supra note 106, at 207 (noting that “entry hurdles could always be lifted” by, 
for example, “information disclosure (such as reporting or financial accounting), 
enhanced transparency requirements or further accountability (including democratic 
decisionmaking or independent oversight)”). 
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submissions than NGOs in different contexts. A dual-track approach would 
also provide different disclosure rules for profit-seeking entities than for 
NGOs, including type, quantity, and frequency of reports and disclosures. The 
regulations applicable to profit-seeking entities could simply be different from 
those for NGOs and tailored to the legitimacy and appearance of corruption 
concerns, as well as the distinctive benefits businesses could offer the process. 
Just as with the disclosure regime, one benefit of opening a separate access 
pathway is that it could help officials and lawmakers get a better sense of the 
origins and purposes of the input they are receiving, and it could help them 
ensure that contributions by entities with a profit motive are not overrepre-
sented in their deliberative process. 
There are a number of potential difficulties and regulatory challenges that 
the separate regulatory pathway would present. The pathway could open the 
door to a flood of new would-be consultants, overwhelming gatekeepers and 
lawmakers. That tide, however, could be stemmed by access barriers that 
would encourage (or require) smaller players to aggregate into associations. 
One concern, however, is that the new business consultants could also crowd 
out the contributions of other members of civil society. The separate track 
might allow businesses to exert too much pressure on lawmakers by, for 
example, flooding them with an “obfuscatory level of detail.”360 This concern 
might be ameliorated by carefully toggling access rights between business 
consultants on the one hand and other members of civil society on the other. 
Theoretically, at least, with a dual-track approach, access rights for each group 
of actors could be controlled separately, so inputs by business entities and other 
actors may be better balanced.  
While the foregoing concerns permit ready answers, three additional 
problems pose more fundamental difficulties that may disqualify a reform 
based on a separate accreditation track and militate instead toward a reform 
focused principally on disclosure:  
First, there is often a very deep blending between business interests and 
other interests, with profit-seeking entities promoting public-regarding goals 
like clean energy or sustainable development and nonprofit entities relying 
heavily on corporate sponsorship for their survival. Is it possible to direct these 
entities into one track or another? Clearly, the separation would not be 
entirely clean. However, forming a separate regulatory pathway would give 
gatekeepers, lawmakers, and other observers (such as other NGOs) a clear 
response and means of eradicating astroturf activism when it is discovered: the 
profit-promoting NGO can simply be required to re-register in the alternative 
for-profit track, thereby exposing and rendering explicit the motive animating 
that entity’s contributions.  
 360. Id. at 221. 
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A second concern, related to the prior “blending” concern, is that a separate 
pathway would not actually eliminate the astroturf activism phenomenon. 
Instead, it would give businesses a way to register as consultants individually, 
while failing to deter them from simultaneously engaging in astroturf 
activism—that is, co-opting NGOs that are registered in the traditional way. 
The issue is as follows: Might businesses simply register in the for-profit track 
while continuing current partnerships or capture of NGOs, thereby engaging 
in both astroturf activism and direct advocacy at the same time? After all, there 
may be many reasons why a business would prefer for its positions to be 
articulated through NGO mouthpieces. This concern suggests that a regulatory 
pathway solution may not be effective unless it is accompanied by an enhanced 
disclosure requirement that is designed to ferret out corporate-NGO links that 
cross a designated threshold of intensity. 
Third, accreditation gatekeepers are already taxed by a flood of NGOs 
seeking access. Without an alternate source of funding or administrative 
capacity, how could gatekeepers administer yet another accreditation track? 
Despite these difficulties, a reform featuring a separate accreditation track 
does offer one clear benefit: a separate accreditation track for business would 
avoid an extension of consultation rights to profit-seeking entities. Some 
commentators have observed a nascent “right” to consult with international 
organizations or a duty of international organizations to consult with the 
public,361 or they have proposed a right to consult as a normative matter.362 
But if individual businesses speak through NGOs and business associations 
count among those NGOs, then affording NGOs a right to consult confers 
participatory rights on businesses. Affording businesses a right to consult or 
assigning international organizations a duty to consult with businesses 
constitutes extending participatory rights to businesses in much the same way 
as American constitutional doctrine, including Citizens United v. FEC,363 has 
recognized expressive rights for corporate persons in the United States. A 
separate regulatory pathway could prevent this otherwise seemingly inevitable 
result. It would instead ensure that businesses are afforded a type and quantum 
of access that is distinct from that of the remainder of civil society. 
 
*     *      * 
 
In sum, the two potential reform approaches offered here are preliminary 
and require further development and study. Both, however, offer potential  
 
 361. Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 368-72. 
 362. See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 62, at 909-10.  
 363. 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
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regulatory means to respond to the astroturf activism phenomenon. They offer 
the potential to allow gatekeepers, officials, and lawmakers to better trace lines 
of accountability, incorporate diverse perspectives into their deliberative 
processes, and facilitate a legitimate lawmaking process.  
Conclusion 
International law is at a crossroads. Increasingly powerful multinational 
business entities demand access to the lawmaking process, but international 
law has not developed adequate responses to that demand. The failures flow 
from profound changes in the relationships between nation-states and business 
entities over the past century. Now, business entities—sometimes rivaling 
nation-states in size and economic status—produce law as well as consume it. 
They serve as co-regulators domestically, standard setters internationally, and 
governors of their own supply chains around the world. Yet they are shut out 
of formal international lawmaking processes. Rather than sit idly by, 
businesses use the access points available to them, however awkward the fit. 
One result is the astroturf activism phenomenon, rife with accountability, 
efficiency, legitimacy, and access problems. As I have argued, the astroturf 
activism phenomenon is the product of a legal relic: an old regime that has 
failed to accommodate a new set of facts. It also serves as a case study for a 
larger challenge: Can foundational international legal rules be updated to 
accommodate rapidly changing relationships between business entities and 
nation-states? International law can respond to this challenge or slip into 
dysfunction and obsolescence. Because major international problems require 
successful multilateral collaboration, the outcome of stasis is failure. But if the 
astroturf activism analysis is a case study, it is also a blueprint. The key is to 
unearth business influence, so as to capture the benefit and minimize the harm. 
 
 
